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THE OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT DRAGNET 
Shu-Yi Oei* 
ABSTRACT 
Taxpayers who hide assets abroad to evade taxes present a serious 
enforcement challenge for the United States. In response, the United States has 
developed a family of initiatives that punish and rehabilitate non-compliant 
taxpayers, raise revenues, and require widespread reporting of offshore 
financial information by financial institutions and taxpayers. Yet, while these 
initiatives help catch willful tax cheats, they have also adversely affected 
immigrants, Americans living abroad, and “accidental Americans.”  
This Article critiques the United States’ offshore tax enforcement 
initiatives, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act and the Internal 
Revenue Service’s offshore voluntary disclosure programs. It argues that the 
United States has been overly focused on two policy priorities in designing 
enforcement at the expense of competing considerations: First, the United 
States has attempted to equalize enforcement against taxpayers with solely 
domestic holdings and those with harder-to-detect offshore holdings by 
imposing harsher reporting requirements and penalties on the latter. But in 
doing so, it has failed to appropriately distinguish among differently situated 
taxpayers with offshore holdings. Second, the United States has focused on 
revenue and enforcement, paying less attention to the significant compliance 
costs and potential social harms that its initiatives create.  
The confluence of these two policy priorities risks creating high costs for 
the wrong taxpayers. While offshore tax enforcement may have been designed 
to catch high-net-worth tax cheats, it may instead impose disproportionate 
burdens on those immigrants and expatriates who have less ability to 
complain, comply, or “substitute out” of the law’s grasp. This Article argues 
that the United States should redesign its enforcement approach to minimize 
these risks and suggests reforms to this end. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Consider the following hypothetical: Al is a wealthy American looking to 
minimize his income taxes. He decides to hide some assets offshore, away 
from the gaze of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Al approaches 
NovoBank, a Swiss private bank. Protected by Swiss bank-secrecy laws, 
NovoBank’s clients enjoy a high degree of secrecy in their holdings. Bruno, a 
NovoBank banker, helps Al move money into a secret NovoBank account in 
Switzerland. Al does not report or pay U.S. tax on the income generated by 
these assets for several years. In addition to Al, Bruno has opened NovoBank 
accounts for other clients, including Clara, a Swiss citizen and resident who 
holds U.S. citizenship by birthright; and Dorian, a Swiss citizen who moved to 
the United States five years ago for work. Neither Clara nor Dorian has 
reported income earned from these Swiss accounts to the United States. 
Now imagine that the United States has discovered that Americans like Al 
have been hiding assets in secret Swiss bank accounts to avoid paying taxes, in 
violation of U.S. tax law.  
This hypothetical illustrates in simple terms the offshore tax evasion 
challenge.1 Such offshore tax evasion has long existed, but U.S. authorities 
were fully alerted to the magnitude of the problem in 2008, thanks to a 
whistleblower.2 The paradigmatic offshore evader is a high-net-worth 
American like Al who has stashed financial assets offshore to avoid paying 
U.S. taxes, assisted by the likes of Bruno and NovoBank.3 However, there are 
other taxpayers with U.S. ties who hold assets offshore who, although perhaps 
not fully tax compliant, may possess less willful intent. These include 
“accidental Americans” like Clara and immigrants to the United States like 
Dorian. Thus, the enforcement challenge confronting the United States is how 
to hold Al wholly accountable while appropriately sorting for more benign 
actors like Clara and Dorian.  
 
 1 Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 667 (2007) (analyzing the use of amnesty programs to increase compliance); Itai Grinberg, 
The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2013) (describing information reporting 
and withholding initiatives to tax offshore accounts); Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
169 (2016) (describing cross-border challenges raised by taxation of Americans based on citizenship); Shu-Yi 
Oei & Diane M. Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (evaluating how tax 
authorities use data leaks to enforce tax compliance across borders). 
 2 See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, IRS Pays Birkenfeld $ 104 Million Whistleblower Award., 136 TAX NOTES 
1359 (2012); Randall Jackson, Former UBS Banker Indicted in Tax Evasion Case, 50 TAX NOTES INT’L 519 
(2008); Randall Jackson, Swiss Bank Official Detained by U.S. Authorities, 50 TAX NOTES INT’L 473 (2008).  
 3 See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.S. Advancing in Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 68 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 543 (Nov. 5, 2012).  
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In the aftermath of the 2008 whistleblower revelations regarding tax 
evasion using Swiss bank accounts, the United States developed a family of 
legislative, regulatory, and prosecutorial measures to combat offshore tax 
evasion. These offshore tax enforcement4 measures include (1) the IRS’s 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs (ODVPs), which offer criminal 
amnesty to taxpayers who come clean; (2) the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Tax Division’s Offshore Compliance Initiative, which consists of criminal 
prosecutions of individual taxpayers and facilitators and a “Swiss Bank 
Program” designed to bring offending Swiss banks into compliance through 
deferred and non-prosecution agreements; (3) the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act of 2010 (FATCA), a far-reaching piece of legislation designed 
to procure information about the offshore financial holdings of U.S. taxpayers 
from foreign countries and banks;5 and (4) the web of bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed between the United States and 
various foreign governments that effectuate FATCA.6  
Proponents and defenders of offshore tax enforcement have described these 
measures as important steps in punishing offenders, ensuring the taxation of 
offshore capital, and discouraging evasion.7 However, others have been 
critical, some harshly so.8 The conversation often has a flavor of the left hand 
 
 4 Others sometimes refer to these measures as “global tax enforcement,” “offshore tax compliance,” or 
“offshore compliance initiatives.” 
 5 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71, 97 (2010) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012)). FATCA was enacted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore 
Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). 
 6 See generally infra Section II.A. 
 7 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting FATCA, 142 TAX NOTES 1245 (2014); Itai 
Grinberg, Taxing Capital in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325 (2013); 
Grinberg, supra note 1; J. Richard Harvey Jr., FATCA—A Report from the Front Lines, 136 TAX NOTES 713 
(2012); J. Richard (Dick) Harvey Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential 
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012) [hereinafter Harvey, Offshore Accounts]; Young Ran (Christine) Kim, 
Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of FATCA, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 335 (2017); Leandra 
Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. 
REV. 499 (2012); Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 675 (2012); see also William R. Davis & Lee A. Sheppard, Keneally Reports Success with 
Swiss Bank Program, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 414 (2014); Kristen A. Parillo, U.S. Disclosure Program Deemed a 
Success, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 161 (2009). Others have made broader suggestions for how to implement 
FATCA or otherwise pursue offshore compliance. See, e.g., Boise, supra note 1; Joanna Heiberg, FATCA: 
Towards a Multilateral Automatic Information Reporting Regime, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685 (2012); 
Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529 (2012) 
[hereinafter Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam]; Scott A. Schumacher, Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting 
Professionals, 89 IND. L.J. 511 (2014).  
 8 See, e.g., Bruce W. Bean & Abbey L. Wright, The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: 
American Legal Imperialism?, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333 (2015); Allison Christians, A Global 
Perspective on Citizenship Taxation, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 193 (2017) [hereinafter, Christians, Global 
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not talking to the right: Those in favor of the U.S. approach seem convinced of 
its efficacy and necessity, and those leery of it regard the U.S. enforcement 
initiatives as costly, overreaching, obnoxious, and unfair.9  
This Article weighs in on the side of offshore tax enforcement’s critics. It 
argues, however, that these critics have not gone far enough in articulating the 
underlying concerns driving their criticisms. The United States’ enforcement 
initiatives are not flawed simply because they are poorly designed. Rather, 
these design flaws are symptomatic of two policy priorities that the United 
States has implicitly embraced and that profoundly color its enforcement 
choices. First, the United States has attempted to equalize enforcement against 
taxpayers with solely domestic holdings and those with harder-to-detect 
offshore holdings (domestic–offshore parity) by imposing harsher reporting 
requirements and penalties on the latter; but in doing so, it has failed to 
appropriately distinguish among differently situated taxpayers with offshore 
holdings (intra-offshore distinctions). Second, the United States has focused on 
revenue recoupment and enforcement, but has paid less attention to the high 
externalized costs imposed on certain actors and to aggregate social welfare 
impacts more generally.  
The disconnect between supporters and detractors of offshore tax 
enforcement exists largely because supporters of the U.S. approach tend to 
agree with (or are at least willing to tolerate) the underlying policy priorities 
that the United States has pursued, while detractors remain skeptical. The 
 
Perspective]; Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (2013) 
[hereinafter Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign]; Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree 
of IGAs (and Why It Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 565 (2013) [hereinafter Christians, Dubious Legal 
Pedigrees of IGAs]; Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling 
Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 161–70 (2014) [hereinafter Kirsch, Revisiting]; Mason, supra 
note 1, at 213–15; Noam Noked, FATCA, CRS, and the Wrong Choice of Who to Regulate, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 
(forthcoming 2018); Oei & Ring, supra note 1; Lee A. Sheppard, FATCA is a Drone: What to Do About 
Compliance?, 64 TAX NOTES INT’L 10 (2011); Frederic Behrens, Comment, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a 
Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205 (2013); Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The 
FATCA Provision of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2967 (2011); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, Find It and Tax It: From TIEAs to IGAs (Mich. Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 443, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2567646; Allison Christians & Arthur Cockfield, Submission to Finance Department on 
Implementation of FATCA in Canada, (Mar. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407264; Arthur J. Cockfield, FATCA and the Erosion of Canadian Taxpayer 
Privacy, Report to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2433198. 
 9 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 8 (“FATCA is a drone. It’s obnoxious, expensive, arrogant, 
extraterritorial, and likely to cause a fair amount of collateral damage while occasionally hitting its targets. It’s 
just like those expensive drones cruising around the Middle East and parts of eastern Africa. 
Moreover, FATCA, like the ever-expanding drone program, won’t go away for quite a while.”). 
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ongoing debate over offshore tax enforcement is, at its core, about which set of 
priorities one thinks is more important, and how to weigh each against the 
other. 
This Article argues that the confluence of the United States’ dual 
commitments has led to a costly enforcement approach that risks creating 
disproportionate and unfair burdens on immigrants, American expatriates, and 
accidental Americans. While more research is required to understand and 
quantify those costs, the existing evidence suggests that they are high in 
relation to revenue collected.10 There is reason to think that some of these 
taxpayers not in the originally targeted population have been 
disproportionately affected.11  
In short, it is plausible that offshore tax enforcement may be a legal regime 
designed to catch high-net-worth tax evaders that also ensnares other groups 
with less ability to complain, comply, or “substitute out” of the law’s grasp. 
This Article argues that in light of this risk, the United States should give more 
weight to intra-offshore distinctions and externalized costs, both of which are 
important considerations that have not received the attention they deserve. It 
suggests reforms that do so.  
This Article’s unique contribution is to argue that offshore tax 
enforcement’s problems are not idiosyncratic, but are the result of the 
deliberate and problematic policy priorities on which the United States has 
focused at the expense of competing considerations. Additionally, this Article 
is the first to analyze all of the United States’ offshore tax enforcement 
initiatives as a unified and comprehensive enforcement approach driven by a 
common underlying vision, rather than as piecemeal laws and programs. This 
underlying vision needs to be probed and understood in order to undertake 
consistent and well-thought-out reforms that reflect clear policy priorities and 
directions. 
Part I explains the vexing problem of offshore tax enforcement and 
describes the key challenges it has posed for the United States. Part II 
describes the interlocking web of offshore tax enforcement initiatives that the 
United States has adopted, and explains how they have worked. Part III 
advances the main thesis of this Article, arguing that the problematic features 
of the U.S. enforcement initiatives are not one-off glitches, but rather are the 
result of two fundamental priorities that the United States has embraced while 
 
 10 See infra Section III.B. 
 11 See infra Section III.A. 
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not taking other considerations adequately into account: (1) a focus on 
domestic–offshore parity while paying less attention to making appropriate 
intra-offshore distinctions and (2) attention to revenue and enforcement while 
insufficiently taking into account the high externalized costs of the 
enforcement initiatives. Finally, Part IV explores how offshore tax 
enforcement could be redesigned to better account for intra-offshore 
distinctions and aggregate social welfare. 
This Article’s analysis comes at a particularly appropriate time: The DOJ 
has recently concluded its Swiss Bank Program and is turning its attention 
beyond Switzerland to offshore financial holdings in other jurisdictions.12 
Meanwhile, FATCA information reporting has begun to take effect. Other 
countries are learning and borrowing from the U.S. experience with FATCA in 
designing similar information-exchange legislation.13 This moment of closing 
out enforcement against Swiss Banks, pursuing tax evaders further afield, and 
moving towards FATCA implementation is an appropriate juncture at which to 
evaluate how the U.S. enforcement initiatives have performed so far, consider 
how their flaws ought to be corrected, and map out directions for further 
research. 
I. THE VEXING PROBLEM OF OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT  
The problem of offshore tax enforcement stems from practical difficulties 
in enforcing the U.S. income tax regime across international borders. 
Section A explains the offshore tax enforcement challenge and highlights 
distinctive features of the offshore enforcement landscape that exacerbate this 
challenge. Section B then summarizes the pre-2008 U.S. attempts at offshore 
tax enforcement and why they were inadequate. Section C explains how the 
events of 2008 created a sea-change in enforcement initiatives.  
A. The Offshore Tax Enforcement Challenge 
The difficulties that the United States has faced in doing offshore tax 
enforcement stem from the confluence of a number of factors. The 
jurisdictional decision to tax U.S. citizens and other U.S. residents on their 
worldwide income creates enforcement challenges for the United States and 
 
 12 See Emily L. Foster, Swiss Bank Program Lives on in “Legacy Phase,” 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 143 
(2016); William Hoke, Focus Shifting Away from Switzerland, Investigators Say, 149 TAX NOTES 628 (2015); 
Nathan J. Richman, Final Swiss Bank Program Entity Resolution Complete, 154 TAX NOTES 64 (2017). 
 13 Blank & Mason, supra note 7; Grinberg, supra note 7; see also OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC 
EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2014).  
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compliance difficulties for a heterogeneous group of taxpayers. The mobility 
of financial capital, systemic risk concerns, and international politics 
exacerbate these enforcement challenges. 
1. Citizenship-Based, Worldwide Taxation on a Heterogeneous Pool of 
Taxpayers 
The United States taxes its citizens on their worldwide income from 
whatever source derived and, importantly, imposes this income tax whether or 
not the citizen is actually living in the United States.14 Thus, a U.S. citizen 
living in New Jersey is taxable on rents from real estate in the Bahamas, 
interest earned on a Hong Kong bank account, and dividends paid on shares of 
a British company, even though that income is not earned from U.S. sources.15 
If that U.S. citizen moved to Mexico, she would still be subject to U.S. tax on 
worldwide income despite her foreign domicile, as long as she remained a U.S. 
citizen.16 These U.S. citizens must file U.S. tax returns, declare all income—
both from domestic and foreign sources—on the return, and comply with 
various other information reporting requirements. While the U.S. allows 
taxpayers to take a foreign tax credit against their U.S. tax liability for income 
taxes paid to other countries,17 this does not relieve U.S. taxpayers of their tax 
filing and information reporting obligations with respect to that foreign 
income.18 
The United States also taxes some non-citizens on their worldwide income, 
just like U.S. citizens. U.S. green card holders (legal permanent residents), for 
example, are also considered “tax residents” and are taxed on their worldwide 
income, on par with citizens.19 Certain long-term U.S. residents who are not 
 
 14 I.R.C. § 61 (2012); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924). This Article takes U.S. citizenship-based, 
worldwide taxation as a given and focuses on the design of offshore enforcement given this jurisdictional 
decision. For examples of literature debating the merits and design of citizenship-based taxation, see Cynthia 
Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705 (2008); Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 8; Kirsch, Revisiting, supra 
note 8; Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007); Mason, supra 
note 1; Daniel Shaviro, Taxing Potential Community Members’ Foreign Source Income, 70 TAX L. REV. 75 
(2016); Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for 
Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2011). 
 15 I.R.C. §§ 861–862. Although such “source” designations are in some sense arbitrary, they are widely 
recognized conventions used in U.S. cross-border taxation to allocate income among jurisdictions.  
 16 That citizen might be eligible for a foreign earned income exclusion under I.R.C. § 911. 
 17 Id. § 901 et seq. 
 18 Even where there is a tax treaty between the United States and that country, the filing obligation may 
still exist. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 519, U.S. TAX GUIDE FOR 
ALIENS 47–48 (2017) (discussing how to report income and treaty benefits on a tax return). 
 19 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1). 
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citizens and not green card holders may also be taxed on worldwide income if 
they have spent enough days in the United States under the “substantial 
presence test” of the Internal Revenue Code.20 Thus, long-term residents of the 
U.S.—including foreign workers working on long-term U.S. visas—may also 
be taxable on their worldwide income and may also be subject to the same tax 
and information reporting rules.  
Thus, the pool of taxpayers subject to U.S. worldwide taxing jurisdiction 
who may experience offshore tax issues is heterogeneous. Some may be willful 
evaders, but others may be Americans working overseas, accidental 
Americans, or green card or long-term visa holders who are taxed as U.S. 
residents.  
These populations are numerically significant. The State Department has 
estimated that as of fiscal year 2015, an estimated 9 million U.S. citizens were 
living overseas.21 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of 
Immigration Statistics estimates that as of January 1, 2012, an estimated 
13.3 million green card holders lived in the United States.22 The number of 
naturalized U.S. citizens stood at about 20 million as of 2014.23 And the total 
U.S. immigrant population was about 43.3 million as of 2015, or about 13.5% 
of the total U.S. population.24 DHS estimates the number of unauthorized 
 
 20 Id. § 7701(b)(3). In general, an individual will meet the substantial presence test if she is “present in 
the United States on at least 31 days during the calendar year” and if “the sum of the number of days . . . [she] 
was present in the United States during the current year and the 2 preceding years (when multiplied by the 
applicable multiplier [specified by the statute]) equals or exceeds 183 days,” computed under a statutory 
formula. Id. The substantial presence test generally will not apply if the taxpayer was “present in the United 
States on fewer than 183 days during the current year” and can prove that she had a tax home in the foreign 
country and a closer connection to that foreign country. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(B). “Tax home” is defined in I.R.C. 
911(d)(3). See id. § 911(d)(3). There are a number of technical exceptions and carve-outs, and the 
determination of residence may also be modified if there is an existing tax treaty. See id. § 7701(b)(3). 
 21 BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CA by the Numbers, https://travel.state.gov/ 
content/dam/travel/CA_By_the_Numbers.pdf (last updated May 2017) [https://web.archive.org/web/201606 
16233331/https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CA_By_the_Numbers.pdf]. 
 22 Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2012, U.S. DEP’T 
HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2012.pdf.  
 23 Naturalization Trends in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/article/naturalization-trends-united-states. 
 24 Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-
immigration-united-states. The Migration Policy Institute defines immigrants to include those without U.S. 
citizenship at birth, such as naturalized citizens, green card holders, refugees and asylees, unauthorized 
immigrants, and temporary work visa holders. Id. 
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immigrants at about 11.4 million as of January 2012.25 The number of work 
visa holders living in the United States is not clear. 
Not all of these inbound and outbound migrant populations will have 
offshore tax holdings and assets. But it seems likely that many could. As 
Professor Allison Christians has argued, while some of these latter categories 
may fail to report income willfully, in other cases, their failure may be a result 
of not understanding their tax obligations or something closer to negligence.26  
2. Distinctive Enforcement and Compliance Challenges Across Borders 
Implementation of the United States’ worldwide tax regime across borders 
creates distinctive enforcement challenges.  
Information Asymmetry. Most pertinently, there is a clear information 
asymmetry problem. The United States has faced persistent difficulties in 
obtaining information about the income of its taxpayers earned from foreign 
sources, for example, interest earned on a foreign bank account. Income earned 
from domestic sources has traditionally been subject to third-party withholding 
and information reporting (for example, wage withholding on Form W-2 and 
reporting of interest and other income on Form 1099), while withholding and 
reporting on foreign income has been much less complete.27 The lack of 
adequate third-party reporting and the relative ease of obscuring foreign 
income and assets from the United States have made it easier for taxpayers to 
not report income on those assets.  
Compliance Challenges for Taxpayers. Cross-border taxation also raises 
compliance challenges for taxpayers. The decision to tax all citizens on 
worldwide income regardless of actual residence means a citizen who resides 
abroad and has never lived in the United States, or has lived in the United 
 
 25 Bryan Baker & Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the 
United States: January 2012, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20Immigrant%20Population%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%20
January%202012_0.pdf. 
 26 Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 8. 
 27 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1441 et seq. (2012); id. § 3402. See generally James Alm et al., Do Individuals 
Comply on Income Not Reported by Their Employer? 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 120 (2009); Leandra Lederman, 
Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps]; Leandra Lederman, 
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007); Joel 
Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance? (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21412, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21412. 
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States only briefly, is nonetheless taxed on worldwide income.28 So, for 
example, a U.S. citizen who acquired citizenship by birthright or a minor who 
automatically acquires citizenship when her parents naturalized is subject to 
worldwide U.S. taxation, even if she has never lived in the United States.29 
Similarly, a citizen who is born in the United States or its territories but who 
moves away is nonetheless subject to U.S. taxation on her worldwide 
income.30 Green card holders temporarily living abroad who have not 
abandoned their green card status are also considered U.S. tax residents subject 
to tax on worldwide income.31 Some of these taxpayers may not be aware of 
their citizenship, their obligation to pay taxes on worldwide income, or their 
obligation to file tax and information returns.  
Some of these enforcement and compliance challenges are not specific to 
the United States. For example, the challenges of enforcing cross-border 
taxation arise in any country that taxes its residents on worldwide income. 
However, other challenges are distinctive to the United States. In particular, 
the decision to tax U.S. citizens regardless of residence has presented 
difficulties for some taxpayers.32 
Complexity. Cross-border tax compliance is made more challenging by the 
law’s complexity. In addition to the basic rule of worldwide taxation, taxpayers 
with cross-border issues may also have to grapple with rules regarding the 
foreign tax credit and the foreign earned income exclusion.33 They may be 
subject to the so-called “anti-deferral” rules pertaining to controlled foreign 
corporations (CFCs) and passive foreign investment companies (PFICs), which 
prevent taxpayers from deferring tax liability by shifting assets offshore and 
holding them in entities.34 Many of these rules pre-date the current wave of 
U.S. initiatives, but their impact has become more resonant in the post-2008 
enforcement environment.35 In addition, the process of computing and 
determining offshore income may be more complex than for domestic assets, 
due to the lack of corroborative information reporting (e.g., taxpayer not 
 
 28 See Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 8, at 203; Mason, supra note 1, at 171–72. 
 29 Again, these taxpayers may be eligible for the foreign earned income exclusion or a foreign tax 
credit, but these do not obviate the need to file and pay taxes. I.R.C. §§ 901, 911. 
 30 Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 8, at 203. 
 31 I.R.C. § 7701(b). 
 32 Montano Cabezas, Reasons for Citizenship-Based Taxation?, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 101 (2016) 
(suggesting the need for new rationales for citizenship-based taxation); Mason, supra note 1 (discussing 
citizenship taxation). 
 33 Id. §§ 901, 911. 
 34 See, e.g., id. §§ 957, 1291.  
 35 See supra note 34; see generally infra Section II (describing the offshore enforcement initiatives). 
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receiving a Form 1099 or W-2), the need to convert foreign currency to U.S. 
dollars, and the need to file various informational forms.36 Complexity means 
that taxpayers may have a difficult time finding competent tax preparers, may 
have to incur higher compliance costs, or may be more susceptible to mistakes.  
Systemic Risk and Politics. All of these offshore enforcement and 
compliance challenges take place in an environment in which systemic risk 
concerns must be navigated. Major facilitators of offshore evasion include 
banks, so the possibility of bank destabilization and failure must be considered 
in deciding how to sanction them, if at all. These considerations may lead 
prosecutors to enter into deferred- and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and 
NPAs) with banks, rather than actually prosecuting them.37 Such corporate 
DPAs and NPAs have been criticized as unfair.38 
U.S. cross-border tax enforcement also takes place against a backdrop of 
international politics, tax treaties, and information exchange agreements. The 
need to operate within the framework of international tax and fiscal diplomacy 
has imposed ongoing frictions on the United States’ ability to seamlessly 
obtain taxpayer information from foreign jurisdictions.  
Capital Mobility. Finally, financial capital is mobile. Taxpayers can 
quickly move assets across jurisdictions, or can transform reportable assets 
(e.g., bank accounts) into non-reportable ones (e.g., real estate). Often, they 
can do so faster than the taxing authority can detect or enforce against the 
asset. The speed at which money can move is particularly problematic given 
that international politics and systemic risk may act as brakes on governments’ 
ability to act.  
B. Pre-2008 Enforcement Initiatives 
Prior to 2008, the United States did make some efforts to enforce offshore 
tax compliance. But these were largely ineffective.  
 
 36 See infra Section II.A.3. 
 37 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS (2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011); 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. (2016). 
 38 See supra note 37; see also PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE 
CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (studying regulatory function of 
DPAs and NPAs). 
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1. Tax Treaty Provisions for Exchange of Information 
The United States has signed treaties for the avoidance of double taxation 
with many countries, and these treaties include Article 26, which provides for 
the exchange of information between signatories.39 Article 26 requires each 
contracting state to exchange information relevant for carrying out the treaty 
provisions or the domestic tax laws of each treaty partner, including 
information relating to tax assessment, administration, enforcement, 
prosecution, or appeals.40 But treaty-based information exchange is only 
provided “on request.”41 Thus, if the United States does not know the specific 
identities of the individual taxpayers, or does not know about the evasion, it 
may be unable to make a sufficiently targeted request.42 There are also grounds 
upon which the treaty partner has historically been able to decline such a 
request. Moreover, the United States does not have treaties with all countries. 
For these reasons, treaty-based exchange of information has not been a 
sufficient mechanism through which to police offshore tax evasion. 
2. TIEAs and MLATs 
The United States has also entered into Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs) with various countries, typically those with whom the 
United States does not have a double tax treaty.43 Unlike tax treaties, TIEAs 
only govern the terms of exchange of information between signatories.44 Like 
tax treaties, TIEAs provide for information exchange only upon request, and 
requests prove difficult if the requesting country does not already have prior 
information.45 In addition, many TIEAs are limited because governments are 
 
 39 United States Income Tax Treaties—A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/international-businesses/united-states-income-tax-treaties-a-to-z (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
 40 Diane Ring, Article 26: Exchange of Information, in GLOBAL TAX TREATY COMMENTARIES (Richard 
Vann et al. eds., 2017) (discussing these elements in the OECD model treaty). 
 41 Id. § 1.2.5.3. 
 42 Id. § 1.2.3. 
 43 I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(C) (2012). Before 2008, the United States had entered into TIEAs with only a few 
tax-haven jurisdictions, including Antigua, the Cayman Islands, Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, 
Netherlands Antilles, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Aruba. Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEAs): United States, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas 
unitedstates.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2017); see also Robert T. Cole et al., U.S. Income Tax Treaties — U.S. 
Competent Authority Functions and Procedures, Tax & Acct. Ctr. (BNA) (2014). After 2008, the United 
States signed TIEAs with Liechtenstein, Gibraltar, Monaco, and Panama, but by this time TIEAs had largely 
been superseded in importance by other multilateral initiatives, including FATCA and the Common Reporting 
Standard. Cole et al., supra. 
 44 Ring, supra note 40, § 3.1.1. 
 45 Id. §§ 2.1.4, 3.1.3. 
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not required to exchange information if it requires deviation from their own 
laws or the laws of the requesting country.46  
In addition to TIEAs, the United States has also entered into Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with a number of countries.47 MLATs are non-
tax-specific bilateral agreements that allow the signatories to obtain evidence 
from the treaty partner in criminal proceedings.48 However, MLATs do not 
extend to civil tax proceedings. Some do not even permit the exchange of tax-
related information.49 Thus, like TIEAs, MLATs have been of limited utility in 
the battle against offshore tax evasion. 
3. The “Qualified Intermediary” Regime 
Another key mechanism by which the United States attempted offshore tax 
enforcement was through the “Qualified Intermediary” (QI) regime. The QI 
system, which took effect on January 1, 2001, required foreign financial 
institutions (FFIs) that were QIs to collect documentation with respect to U.S. 
and foreign customers, to perform U.S. tax withholding on certain customers, 
and to file U.S. information returns with respect to others.50  
However, the QI regime did not require reporting of foreign-source income 
paid to U.S. taxpayers. U.S. customers could therefore evade taxes by 
investing abroad in activities generating foreign-source income. QIs were also 
not required to look through foreign shell entities to determine the actual 
beneficial owner. This meant that a U.S. person could create a foreign entity 
with a separate legal identity, and the QIs would take the position that this 
entity was the beneficial owner of the income or assets and not inquire (or 
report) further.  
 
 46 Cole et al., supra note 43. 
 47 Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/ 
2012/vol2/184110.htm. 
 48 Id. 
 49 IRM 4.60.1.8(3) (Sept. 19, 2014); Cole et al., supra note 43, at A-64. 
 50 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-1 (2017); Harvey, Offshore Accounts, supra note 7, at 474. Before the QI system 
took effect, a U.S. taxpayer could invest in U.S. ventures through an FFI account and the FFI would not be 
required to report information about that taxpayer to the United States. Harvey, Offshore Accounts, supra note 
7, at 474. U.S. taxpayers could thus avoid reporting or paying tax on that income. In addition, U.S. payors 
(e.g., U.S. banks) were not required to obtain information from FFIs about their foreign clients (e.g., foreign 
shell entities), and hence did not properly withhold taxes on U.S. source payments to these foreign customers 
made through the FFIs. Id. In effect, the QI system changed things by requiring QIs to “know your customer.” 
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4. FBAR Filing 
The United States has historically also obtained information about foreign 
financial accounts via the so-called Form “FBAR” (Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 114), “Report of Foreign Bank and Final 
Accounts.”51 U.S. persons with an interest in or signatory authority over 
foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 are required to file this form.52 
Before 2008, however, FBAR enforcement was not strictly policed.53 
Moreover, the focus of FBAR enforcement was more about money laundering 
than tax compliance. Thus, FBAR compliance was historically low. FBAR 
enforcement has ramped up since the current wave of initiatives came into 
effect.54 
C. The 2008 Whistleblower Leaks 
Two significant whistleblower leaks in 2008 significantly changed the 
offshore tax enforcement landscape, and led to the development of the current 
family of enforcement initiatives.  
1. The UBS Leak  
The more significant leak occurred with respect to UBS Bank in 
Switzerland. In 2007, Bradley Birkenfeld, a former private banker at UBS, 
blew the whistle on the bank and shared information about secret client 
accounts and improprieties at UBS Bank with the DOJ, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the IRS, and the U.S. Senate.55 For his trouble, 
Birkenfeld was arrested and charged by federal prosecutors with conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, to which he pled guilty and was sentenced to forty 
 
 51 Dep’t of the Treasury, TDF 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (2011). This 
form “FBAR,” which was previously a paper filing, now can only be filed electronically. See BSA E-Filing 
System, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html (last visited Sept. 
11, 2017).  
 52 See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (“Reports of foreign financial accounts.”); supra 
note 51. 
 53 Amanda Athanasiou, News Analysis: Minding the Gap in FBAR Filings, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 722 
(2016). 
 54 Id. 
 55 BRADLEY C. BIRKENFELD, LUCIFER’S BANKER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW I DESTROYED SWISS 
BANK SECRECY (2016); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 1 (discussing the UBS and other leaks). For a detailed 
summary of the UBS scandal, see William Byrnes, Background and Current Status of FATCA and CRS (Sept. 
2017 Edition), in LEXISNEXIS GUIDE TO FATCA & CRS COMPLIANCE § 1.03[1] (Tex. A&M Univ. Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 17-75, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3045459. 
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months in prison.56 Yet, he was also awarded $104 million under a new 
whistleblower law.57  
The information Birkenfeld provided caused significant outrage in tax and 
public circles. Propelled by the UBS scandal, the IRS and DOJ began to 
investigate UBS’s illegal activities, punish the bank, and develop other 
enforcement strategies. On July 1, 2008, the IRS served a “John Doe” 
summons on UBS to obtain information regarding up to 52,000 U.S. taxpayers 
who had used UBS accounts to evade taxes.58 Subsequently, on February 28, 
2009, UBS entered into a DPA with the DOJ, pursuant to which UBS agreed to 
pay $780 million to the United States,59 including interest and penalties, and to 
turn over a small number of client names.60 The DPA specifically allowed the 
United States to continue to seek enforcement of the 2008 John Doe summons. 
After much diplomatic and legislative maneuvering,61 the United States 
ultimately obtained information concerning approximately 4,000 account 
 
 56 Motion for Sentence Reduction, United States v. Birkenfeld, Case No. 08-60099-CR-ZLOCH (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 17, 2009); Sentencing Memorandum of Defendant Bradley Birkenfeld, Birkenfeld, Case No. 08-
60099-CR-ZLOCH (Aug. 18, 2009); David D. Stewart, Former UBS Banker Sentenced to 40 Months in 
Prison, 124 TAX NOTES 747 (2009). 
 57 I.R.C. § 7623 (2012); see Coder, supra note 2; Ken Stier, Why Is the UBS Whistle-Blower Headed to 
Prison?, TIME (Oct. 6, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1928897,00.html. 
 58 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Judge Approves IRS Summons for UBS Swiss Bank 
Account Records (July 1, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/txdv08584.htm; Levin Statement on Swiss 
Rejection of UBS Settlement, 2010 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 110-31 (2010). 
 59 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States vs. UBS AG, Case No. 09-60033-CR-COHN 
(S.D. Fla. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2009/02/19/UBS_Signed_Deferred_ 
Prosecution_Agreement.pdf. Of the $780 million, $380 million represented disgorgement of profits from 
cross-border business. The remainder represented unpaid withholding taxes, interest, penalties, and restitution 
for unpaid taxes. Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 On August 19, 2009, the IRS and DOJ announced an agreement with the Swiss government to let 
UBS disclose 4,450 client names per treaty request by UBS. See Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Swiss Confederation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Discloses Terms 
of Agreement with Swiss Government Regarding UBS (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-
discloses-terms-agreement-swiss-government-regarding-ubs; I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-75 (Aug. 19, 
2009). However, UBS clients appealed, and in January 2010, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled 
that the agreement violated Swiss law. The Swiss government then sought parliamentary approval for the 
agreement to give it the force of a treaty. In March 2010, Switzerland and the United States signed a protocol 
that allowed the Swiss Federal Tax Administration to determine which clients’ data could be disclosed, but 
that prevented disclosure until parliament actually approved. Protocol Amending the Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the Swiss Confederation, BUNDESAMT FÜR JUSTIZ BJ (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/wirtschaft/fallubs/aenderungsprotokoll-amtshilfeabkommen-e.pdf. In 
April 2010, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court rejected the UBS clients’ appeal, paving the way for 
disclosure of the clients’ names. David D. Stewart, Swiss Court Upholds Provisional Application of UBS 
Agreement., 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 385 (2010). 
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holders, far fewer than the 52,000 it had originally sought.62 Using this data, 
the United States set about punishing offenders, pressuring others into 
voluntarily coming clean, and developing a comprehensive system of 
regulation and enforcement to deal with offshore tax evasion.  
2. The LGT Leak 
Around the same time, a smaller scandal emerged in Liechtenstein 
involving LGT Bank when an employee stole confidential client data of about 
1,400 offshore clients.63 The data revealed that LGT had been active in helping 
offshore clients hide assets in Liechtenstein by maintaining undisclosed client 
accounts, advising clients to open accounts held by Liechtenstein foundations 
to hide their beneficial ownership, helping clients design complex structures to 
hide asset ownership, and helping disguise transfers of assets to and from LGT 
accounts.64 
In early 2008, a number of countries, including the United States, started 
investigating offshore tax evasion by their citizens based on the LGT data.65 
The United States and Liechtenstein eventually signed a TIEA in December 
2008, effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2009.66  
The UBS and LGT leaks were significant drivers in spurring the United 
States to investigate and address offshore tax evasion.67 In 2008, the U.S. 
Senate Subcommittee on offshore banks and tax evasion issued a major report, 
which triggered a serious push towards reform.68  
 
 62 The remaining few hundred were not turned over because they did not meet the criteria. On 
November 16, 2010, the IRS announced that it had withdrawn the John Doe summons. IRS Withdraws ‘John 
Doe’ Summons Against UBS Over Tax Fraud Allegations, 220 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) GG-1 (Nov. 17, 2010).  
 63 See STAFF OF U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN 
BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 2 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 SENATE REPORT]; see also Randall Jackson, 
Bank Sells Trust Businesses in Wake of Tax Scandal, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 951 (2009); Lynnley Browning, 
Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/ 
business/worldbusiness/15kieber.html. 
 64 See 2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 2. 
 65 I.R.S. News Release IR-2008-26 (Feb. 26, 2008); Randall Jackson, Germany Recovers Millions 
Through Liechtenstein Tax Investigations, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 113 (2010); Randall Jackson, More Tax 
Cheats in the Doghouse over Liechtenstein Tax Evasion, 2008 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 62-2 (2008) (citing 
investigations by the United Kingdom, Italy, France). 
 66 See Joann M. Weiner, News Analysis: The New TIEA: A Christmas Gift to Liechtenstein, 52 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 831 (2008); Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein on Tax Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Relating 
to Taxes, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/us% 
20liechtenstein%20tiea.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
 67 Oei & Ring, supra note 1 (explaining how these leaks have driven the direction of tax law). 
 68 2008 SENATE REPORT, supra note 63.  
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II. THE U.S. APPROACH TO OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT 
In the wake of the 2008 whistleblower leaks, the United States has 
developed a family of initiatives designed to combat offshore tax evasion. 
Section A presents a taxonomy of U.S. offshore tax enforcement initiatives, 
section B describes the mechanisms underpinning how these initiatives work, 
and section C briefly discusses the extant scholarly and policy commentary on 
their effectiveness. 
A. A Taxonomy of Current Offshore Tax Enforcement Strategies 
The United States’ offshore tax enforcement initiatives can be roughly 
grouped into three categories: (1) initiatives aimed at punishing bad behavior, 
(2) backward-looking regulatory initiatives geared toward bringing past and 
current offenders into compliance, and (3) forward-looking initiatives geared 
toward enforcing compliance by gathering data on taxpayers and their bank 
accounts.  
These categories are not watertight, but rather function as rough heuristics 
that facilitate analysis. Together, these initiatives form a web of regulation and 
enforcement via which various actors are held accountable, are constrained in 
their ability to evade, and are harnessed as information sources to help catch 
other evaders. The interactions between these initiatives generate compliance 
cascades by using information extracted from one actor to gather (or threaten 
to gather) data about other actors, thus encouraging follow-on disclosure and 
compliance.  
1. Punishment 
First, the United States has prosecuted taxpayers, bankers, and others who 
engaged in or facilitated offshore tax evasion. The United States began these 
prosecutions using information obtained through the UBS DPA and the 2008 
John Doe summons.69 The United States has also obtained additional 
information about other offenders using information gathered under its 
offshore voluntary disclosure programs and Swiss Bank program.70 
The DOJ pursued prosecutions of offshore tax offenders as part of its 
Offshore Compliance Initiative (OCI), which has been advertised as one of the 
 
 69 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.  
 70 See infra Section II.B.1 (describing cascading compliance dynamics inherent in offshore tax 
enforcement).  
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Tax Division’s top litigation priorities.71 The DOJ’s OCI page at one point 
boasted that “[f]rom 2008 through April 2013, the Tax Division has charged 
over 30 banking professionals and 60 account holders, thus far resulting in five 
convictions after trial and 55 guilty pleas, including 2 trial convictions and 16 
guilty pleas in the first four months of 2013 alone.”72 The number of 
indictments, prosecutions, and pleas has likely grown since that announcement. 
While exact numbers are difficult to find, one prominent tax blog reports as of 
July 2016 the indictments of 117 taxpayers with offshore accounts and forty-
nine enablers (bankers, attorneys, and advisors), generating 104 guilty pleas 
and nineteen guilty verdicts.73 In a November 2, 2016 speech to the American 
Bar Association, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Caroline Ciraolo 
noted that the DOJ, in collaboration with the IRS Criminal Investigations unit, 
had charged over 160 U.S. accountholders with tax evasion and failure to 
report offshore assets along with fifty enablers.74 
While most Swiss banks received DPAs and NPAs in the aftermath of the 
UBS scandal, the DOJ did secure guilty pleas from Wegelin Bank and Credit 
Suisse, two major Swiss Banks.75 In fact, the guilty plea led to Wegelin’s 
closure.76  
2. Backward-Looking Regulatory Initiatives 
Punishment aside, the United States has also pursued programs designed to 
bring banks and taxpayers who have previously evaded taxes back into 
 
 71 Offshore Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/tax/offshore-
compliance-initiative (last visited July 20, 2015) [http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/14-13301.pdf] 
[hereinafter Offshore Compliance Initiative 2015]. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Jack Townsend, Offshore Charges/Convictions Spreadsheet (7/22/16), FED. TAX CRIMES, 
http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/p/offshore-charges-convictions.html (last visited July 22, 2016). 
 74 Caroline D. Ciraolo, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address 
at the American Bar Association’s 27th Annual Philadelphia Tax Conference (Nov. 2, 2016), in Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Caroline D. Ciraolo Delivers Keynote Address at the American Bar 
Association’s 27th Annual Philadelphia Tax Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-caroline-d-ciraolo-delivers-keynote-address (last updated 
Dec. 21, 2016). 
 75 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist 
U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-
guilty-conspiracy-aid-and-assist-us-taxpayers-filing-false-returns; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Swiss 
Bank Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Conspiracy to Evade Taxes (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/swiss-bank-pleads-guilty-manhattan-federal-court-conspiracy-evade-
taxes. 
 76 Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea, REUTERS, Jan. 
4, 2013, 10:11 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swissbank-wegelin-idUSBRE9020O020130104.  
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compliance. The two key initiatives in this category are the IRS’s Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Programs (OVDPs) for individuals and the DOJ’s Swiss 
Bank Program for Swiss banks.77 
a. Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs 
The IRS’s OVDPs are designed to encourage offenders to voluntarily 
disclose the existence of offshore assets and accounts in exchange for reduced 
penalties and protection from criminal prosecution. In exchange, the IRS can 
collect more revenue and potentially obtain more information about banks, 
facilitators and other taxpayers. The IRS announced OVDPs in 2009, 2011, 
and 2012, and updated the program in 2014.78  
The 2009 OVDP was announced in March 2009 against the backdrop of 
the UBS DPA and enforcement of the 2008 John Doe summons.79 This played 
on taxpayer fears, and some taxpayers who did not know whether their 
information would be exposed decided to enter the OVDP rather than risk 
criminal prosecution. 
After the 2009 OVDP closed on October 15, 2009, the IRS subsequently 
announced the 2011 OVDP on February 8, 2011.80 The 2011 OVDP expired 
on September 9, 2011.81 In January 2012, the IRS then announced the 2012 
OVDP.82 The IRS made some modifications to the 2012 OVDP in June 2014, 
 
 77 Again, my classification of these programs as backward-looking and compliance-centered does not 
mean that they are not also punitive or without forward-looking elements. Both programs do have fines and 
penalties and have been used to investigate other offshore tax evaders and to pressure banks and foreign 
governments going forward. Stephen Joyce, Offshore Data Invaluable in Building Civil, Criminal Cases, 124 
Daily Tax Rep (BNA) G-4 (June 28, 2016). 
 78 Lederman, supra note 7, at 500–01, 501 n.8. The IRS did also have a 2003 OVDP associated with its 
credit card initiative. Id. at 501 n.13; see also Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers 2014, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers-2012-revised (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2017). For a detailed survey of the OVDPs, see Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.04[1]. 
 79 Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/voluntary-disclosure-questions-and-answers (last updated Oct. 1, 2017); 2009 Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/2009-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-
program (last updated Aug. 27, 2017). 
 80 I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011); 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/2011-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-initiative (last 
updated Aug. 12, 2017). 
 81 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, supra note 80 (extending the original August 31, 2011 
deadline). 
 82 I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012); I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012); 
2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-
offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program (last updated Sept. 10, 2017). 
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and on March 13, 2018, the IRS announced that it would start winding down 
the program and would close it on September 28, 2018.83  
i. Core Program Features 
The OVDPs have evolved since 2009, but the programs have unifying 
features.84 In all versions, entrance into the OVDP allowed taxpayers to avoid 
criminal prosecution by paying (1) back taxes and interest owed for a number 
of years (between six and eight), (2) an accuracy- or delinquency-related 
penalty on the unreported income for those years, and (3) a miscellaneous 
offshore penalty (between 20% and 25% of the highest amount in the foreign 
bank account or highest asset value).85 Taxpayers entering the OVDPs are also 
required to file amended or late FBARs and turn over information about 
foreign bank accounts, including bank names and bank contacts, to the United 
States.86  
ii. Reduced Penalties and Simplified Procedures  
The IRS did make provisions for those with smaller account balances who 
did not know they were U.S. citizens or who satisfied certain criteria indicating 
that the noncompliance was less serious. This has generally taken the form of 
reduced penalty structures and simplified procedures. For example, the 2011 
and 2012 OVDPs implemented a 12.5% penalty for those with offshore 
account balances under $75,00087 and a 5% penalty for overseas residents who 
did not know they were U.S. citizens and taxpayers who (1) did not open the 
account, (2) had minimal contact with the account, (3) did not withdraw more 
than $1,000 in any year covered by the OVDP, and (4) had paid taxes on the 
 
 83 I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73 (last updated Aug. 3, 2017); I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-52 (last 
updated Mar. 13, 2018). The IRS noted that the streamlined program would remain in place, although the 
streamlined procedures, too, could be ended at some point in the future. See sources cited infra notes 91–99 
and accompanying text. 
 84 See Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.04[1].  
 85 The 2009 OVDP required six years of back reporting and implemented a 20% miscellaneous offshore 
penalty. Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 79. The 2011 version increased the 
reportable years to eight and the miscellaneous offshore penalty to 25% and the 2012 version increased the 
penalty to 27.5%. Lederman, supra note 7, at 516; 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, supra note 
82. Thus, at least in some respects, later versions of the OVDP were designed to ensure that 2009 entrants into 
the program were not prejudiced. Starting in 2014, the IRS began requiring that the full penalty be paid upfront 
to enter the OVDP. Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2014, 
supra note 78. 
 86 See Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 79 (Question 25). 
 87 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2012, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-
program-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers (last updated Aug. 27, 2017) (FAQ 53).  
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amounts deposited.88 These reduced penalties were extended to 2009 OVDP 
participants in order to not disadvantage them.89 
The 2009, 2011, and 2012 OVDPs also contained a mechanism under 
which a taxpayer could enter the OVDP but then opt out of the OVDP penalty 
structure in favor of a standard audit once proposed penalties were assessed, if 
the taxpayer’s facts suggested that the OVDP penalties were too high.90 A 
taxpayer might choose to opt out in cases in which the facts show that she was 
not willful. 
In 2012, the IRS announced a “streamlined” procedure to let certain 
taxpayers resolve their offshore tax issues in a simplified manner involving 
lower penalties.91 The 2012 version of the streamlined program was open to 
U.S. taxpayers residing abroad who owed $1,500 or less in tax for any of the 
covered years.92 Taxpayers were required to fill out a “risk assessment 
questionnaire,” and the level of review given the taxpayer’s submission 
depended on the answers.93 All penalties were waived.94 Adoption of the 
streamlined program potentially stopped taxpayers from having to use the 
regular OVDP just for its opt-out mechanism.95 
In 2014, the IRS modified the streamlined program, opening it up to 
taxpayers residing in the United States and eliminating the $1,500 threshold 
and risk questionnaire.96 However, the 2014 streamlined program required 
 
 88 Lederman, supra note 7, at 515; Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions 
and Answers 2012, supra note 87 (FAQ 52); see also I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64, supra note 82; 2011 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications/2011_20OVDI_20FAQs.pdf.  
 89 Lederman, supra note 7, at 516. 
 90 Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enf’t, Internal Revenue Serv., 
OVDI Opt Out and Removal Guide & Memorandum (June 1, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/ 
2011_ovdi_opt_out_and_removal_guide_and_memo_june_1_2011.pdf; Lederman, supra note 7, at 516; 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2014, supra note 78 (FAQs 
49, 51, 51.3). 
 91 I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-65 (June 26, 2012); Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/streamlined-filing-
compliance-procedures (last updated Sept. 11, 2017) (noting an effective date of September 1, 2012). 
 92 See sources cited supra note 91. 
 93 I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73 (last updated Aug. 3, 2017). 
 94 Id. 
 95 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS 231 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 NTA 
REPORT] (“Recognizing the OVD programs were excessively burdensome and unfair to benign actors, in 2012 
the IRS created a ‘streamlined’ program that allows some ‘low risk’ nonresidents to avoid the burdensome opt-
in-opt-out process.”). 
 96 I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-73, supra note 93. 
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taxpayers to certify that previous failures were due to non-willful conduct.97 
The 2014 streamlined program continued to waive penalties for program-
eligible U.S. taxpayers living abroad, and imposed a penalty of 5% of the 
maximum aggregate balance of the unreported financial accounts of U.S. 
residents.98 Given the expansion of the streamlined program to include non-
willful U.S. taxpayers residing in the United States, the 5% and 12.5% reduced 
penalty structures in the regular OVDP were eliminated.99  
iii. Numbers 
As of October 2016, the IRS reported that the three OVDPs had brought in 
more than 55,800 disclosures and yielded over $9.9 billion in taxes, interest, 
and penalties since 2009.100 The streamlined program had brought in 48,000 
taxpayers and yielded about $450 million in taxes, interest, and penalties.101 
More recently, the IRS reported that the regular OVDPs had brought in 56,000 
taxpayers and $11.1 billion in taxes, interest, and penalties and that the 
streamlined programs had brought in an additional 65,000 additional 
taxpayers.102 
b. Swiss Bank Program 
The Swiss Bank Program represented the culmination of U.S.–Swiss 
attempts to create a framework under which Swiss banks could cooperate with 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequency Questions and Answers 2014, supra note 78; 
Transition Rules: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/international-taxpayers/transition-rules-frequently-asked-questions-faqs (last updated Aug. 3, 
2017). 
 99 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2014, supra note 
78. 
 100 I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137 (Oct. 21, 2016); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX 
ADMIN., No. 2016-30-030, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE 
AND PROCESSING EFFORTS (2016); I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-116 (last updated Aug. 4, 2017). The IRS had 
previously reported that the 2009 OVDP brought in 15,000 disclosures and collected $3.4 billion in back taxes, 
interest and penalties prior to its closing date, with another 3,000 disclosures after its closing date. I.R.S. Fact 
Sheet FS-2014-6 (last updated Aug. 3, 2017). The 2011 program brought in 15,000 disclosures and $1.6 billion 
(based on 70% of cases closed that year), and the 2012 program had brought in 12,000 disclosures as of June 
2014. Id. 
 101 I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137, supra note 100. Thus, the IRS commissioner noted that in total, 
the IRS had collected about $10 billion and brought 100,000 taxpayers into compliance via the OVDPs as of 
October 2016. Id. 
 102 I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-52, supra note 83.  
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the United States in its offshore tax investigations while remaining compliant 
with Swiss laws.103 
i. Origins of the Program  
Based on information obtained from the Birkenfeld leak and from OVDP 
participants, the United States became aware that other Swiss banks had also 
facilitated offshore tax enforcement and turned its prosecutorial attentions to 
those banks.104 However, the Swiss banks were prohibited from sharing 
information with the United States by Swiss domestic laws.105 
The risk of U.S. prosecution of Swiss banks became apparent to Swiss 
authorities after the United States indicted three Wegelin Bank employees in 
January 2012, and Wegelin itself pled guilty and ceased operations.106 These 
developments prompted the Swiss Federal Council (Parliament’s upper house) 
to propose legislation in 2013 that would exempt banks from criminal 
prosecution under Swiss laws and allow them to share data with the United 
States.107 However, in June 2013, the Swiss National Counsel (the lower 
house) rejected the bill, announcing an alternative “Plan B” on July 3.108 Plan 
B—which was ultimately enacted into law on August 29, 2013—is the current 
Swiss Bank Program.109  
 
 103 See generally Corinne Nhaissi, Swiss Bank Accounts: Lifting the Veil, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 
(Oct. 5, 2013, 5:07 PM), https://cblr.columbia.edu/swiss-bank-accounts-lifting-the-veil/ (describing the Swiss 
Bank Program). For a more detailed description of the Swiss Bank Program, see Byrnes, supra note 55, 
§ 1.03[3].  
 104 Walter H. Boss & Andrea Scherrer, From Birkenfeld to the Program: A Review of the Swiss-U.S. Tax 
Dispute, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 1203 (2013). The United States apparently did not ask for data identifying bank 
clients because that information could only be obtained under the administrative assistance procedure in 
Article 26 of the U.S.–Swiss treaty. (It was unclear whether client information could even have been obtained 
under Article 26 because the Protocol Amending the U.S.–Swiss Treaty to permit these disclosures has not yet 
been ratified.) See Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., June 5, 2014, 
S. Treaty Doc. 112-1 (2011).  
 105 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN DATENSCHUTZ [FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION] June 19, 1992, SR 
235.1 art. 6 (prohibiting transfer of employee names); SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, art. 271 (prohibiting banks from taking actions on behalf of a 
foreign authority (the United States) in Switzerland). 
 106 Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104, at 1204. 
 107 On April 4, 2012, the Swiss Federal Council authorized Swiss banks under U.S. investigation to 
transfer the requested bank and employee data by exempting them from the prohibitions of the Swiss Criminal 
Code. Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104, at 1204. However, the Swiss Data Protection Act remained a problem. 
Thus, in May 2013, Swiss Federal Council proposed “Lex USA.” Id. 
 108 Id. at 1205. 
 109 Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104, at 1204; Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (last updated Feb. 6, 2017). 
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ii. Program Details 
Broadly speaking, the Swiss Bank Program allowed Swiss banks to resolve 
potential criminal liabilities by entering into deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements with the United States.110 The Program grouped banks into four 
categories based on level of culpability or criminal exposure. The heart of the 
program consisted of so-called Category 2 banks, which were banks not 
already under DOJ investigation, but that had reason to believe they had 
committed U.S. tax offenses.111 In contrast, Category 1 banks were those 
already under DOJ investigation as of August 29, 2013.112 Category 1 banks 
were not eligible for the program; instead, they had to interface with the DOJ 
directly and were generally able to enter into DPAs with the United States.113 
Category 2 banks were required to inform the DOJ about their cross-border 
business involving U.S.-related accounts, including the names and functions of 
key employees and information about fund transfers into and out of U.S.-
related accounts closed during the applicable period (so-called “leaver 
lists”).114 These banks were also required to turn over the names of relationship 
managers and third parties associated with these accounts.115 Thus, Category 2 
banks turned over a treasure trove of information, short of actual client names.  
Category 2 banks were assessed fines based on a percentage of the high 
balance amount in their U.S.-related accounts, which varied based on dates.116 
Banks were more heavily penalized if they accepted fund transfers from UBS 
 
 110 Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104, at 1205. The program was built on three components: (1) an August 
29, 2013 Joint Statement between the U.S. and Swiss governments setting the Program’s parameters; (2) the 
U.S.’s development of the U.S. tax program for Swiss Banks; and (3) a Swiss-side model authorization 
governing the parameters of bank cooperation with U.S. authorities within the scope of existing Swiss law. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE SWISS 
FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT]; FED. DEP’T OF FIN., 
SWISS CONFEDERATION, GUIDANCE NOTE ON THE SWISS MODEL ORDER OF JULY 3, 2013 (2013); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE TAX DIVISION’S FURTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE PROGRAM FOR NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS OR NON-TARGET LETTERS FOR SWISS BANKS (June 5, 2014). 
 111 Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104, at 1205–06. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. Category 3 and 4 banks are those eligible to receive a “non-target letter” from the DOJ, either 
because they had not engaged in any U.S.-illegal misconduct and agreed to certain compliance safeguards, or 
because they had a strictly local client base and no offshore business. Id.; see also Emily L. Foster, ABA 
Section of Taxation Meeting: Swiss Bank Program Lives on in “Legacy” Phase, 153 TAX NOTES 236 (2016). 
 114 Boss & Scherrer, supra note 104. 
 115 Id. at 1207. 
 116 The fine was 20% of the undeclared account amount for accounts existing as of August 1, 2008; 30% 
for accounts opened between August 1, 2008 and February 28, 2009; and 50% for accounts opened after 
February 28, 2009. JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 110, § II.H, at 6.  
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and other banks in the aftermath of the UBS leak.117 A bank could reduce the 
fine if it could show that the client had already declared the account to the IRS 
or it had already been disclosed under an OVDP.118  
In exchange for their cooperation, Category 2 banks received non-
prosecution agreements with the DOJ.119 The deadline for signing letters of 
intent for Category 2 banks was December 31, 2013, and the last NPA was 
signed on January 27, 2016.120 Altogether, the DOJ entered into seventy-eight 
NPAs with eighty Category 2 banks, and collected $1.37 billion in penalties 
from those banks with respect to 35,000 U.S.-related accounts.121  
3. Forward-Looking Regulatory Initiatives 
The statutory capstone of the United States’ battle against offshore tax 
evasion is FATCA.122 FATCA is widely regarded as a major turning point in 
the development of automatic exchange of financial information among 
various countries.123  
a. Obligations of Foreign Financial Institutions 
FATCA generally requires FFIs to report bank account information of U.S. 
persons to the United States and to withhold taxes on certain accounts.124 If the 
FFI does not comply, FATCA mandates that parties making interest, dividend, 
rent, and other payments to that FFI must withhold and remit 30% of any such 
payment to the IRS.125 This rule applies to all withholdable payments to the 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. § II.A, at 3.  
 120 Id.; Swiss Bank Program, supra note 109. 
 121 Foster, supra note 113; Nathan J. Richman, Final Swiss Bank Program Entity Resolution Complete, 
154 TAX NOTES 64 (2017). The DPAs with Category 1 banks yielded $4.439 billion dollars in penalties. Swiss 
Bank—Penalties—Statistics, U.S. TAX PROGRAM, http://www.ustaxprogram.com/penalty-statistics/ (last 
updated Jan. 27, 2016) (including UBS and Wegelin). There were about fourteen Category 1 banks. Jack 
Townsend, List of 14 Swiss Banks Under Criminal Investigation (3/9/14), FED. TAX CRIMES (Mar. 9, 2014, 
6:57 PM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2014/03/list-of-14-swiss-banks-under-criminal.html. 
 122 I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012). 
 123 Grinberg, supra note 1, at 334.  
 124 I.R.C. § 1471(b). 
 125 FATCA provides that if an FFI or non-financial foreign entity (NFFE) does not meet the reporting 
requirements in § 1471(b), then the “withholding agent” of any “withholdable payment” to that FFI must 
deduct and withhold 30% of the amount of that payment. Id. § 1471(a). A “withholdable payment” generally 
includes “any payment of interest (including any original issue discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, 
premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or 
periodical gains, profits, and income, if such payment is from sources within the United States,” and “any 
OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 
2018] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT DRAGNET 683 
FFI, not just those related to U.S. account holders.126 Thus, FATCA effectively 
punishes non-compliant FFIs by imposing an onerous 30% withholding tax on 
all U.S. source payments made to the FFI itself, regardless of the FFI’s ability 
to pay or to claim a reduced tax rate under treaty, and regardless of whether 
such payments pertain to unreported U.S. accounts. Given the importance of 
the U.S. market to most FFIs, the threat of 30% FATCA withholding has 
proven to be an effective stick to force FFIs into compliance.127 
FATCA performs two related functions. First, FATCA gives the United 
States more information about the offshore account holdings of U.S. taxpayers. 
Second, if taxpayers know that information about their offshore holdings is 
available to the United States, they are more likely to report and pay tax on the 
income. Thus, information corroboration and deterrence are two major 
justifications for the statute. 
To avoid FATCA withholding, the FFI must satisfy the following reporting 
requirements. The FFI must (1) obtain information necessary to determine 
which of its accounts are U.S. accounts; (2) “comply with such verification and 
due diligence procedures” in performing such account identification; (3) report 
to the United States annually the information required by statute (which 
includes the name and other information of any U.S. account holder, the 
account number, the account balance, and information regarding gross receipts 
and withdrawals); (4) perform 30% tax withholding on any “passthru 
payments” made to non-complying FFIs or to any account holder that has not 
provided the information necessary to determine whether the account is a U.S. 
account;128 (5) comply with IRS requests for further information; and (6) when 
foreign law prevents reporting of information to the IRS, obtain a waiver, and 
if not possible, close the account.129  
The real-world implementation of FFI FATCA obligations has been 
accomplished using a series of intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) between 
 
gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any property of a type which can produce interest or 
dividends from sources within the United States.” Id. § 1473.  
 126 Id. §§ 1471–1474. 
 127 See Grinberg, supra note 1, at 335–36, 336 n.109 (detailing that FATCA has a “coercive force” on 
FFIs). 
 128 This includes FFIs that don’t comply with the I.R.C. § 1471(b) requirements, or to FFIs that have 
elected to be withheld upon rather than to withhold on their own “recalcitrant account holder[s].” I.R.C. 
§ 1471(b)(1)(D), (b)(3). 
 129 Id. § 1471(b)–(c). 
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the United States and other countries.130 The IGAs in force have been based on 
two models released by the United States in collaboration with foreign 
governments. Under Model 1, the FFI must report all required information to a 
designated domestic government agency, which then reports the information to 
the IRS.131 Under Model 2, the FFI must register and report the information 
directly to the IRS.132 IGAs were needed in part to ease reporting burdens on 
FFIs, but also because complying with FATCA could potentially put FFIs at 
risk of violating their own domestic laws.133 Because IGAs constitute an 
agreement between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction, they protect 
FFIs from committing potential domestic law violations.  
FATCA is revolutionary in that it harnesses foreign banks and other FFIs 
to help the United States enforce tax compliance, but it draws upon familiar 
mechanisms of information reporting and withholding.134 Studies show that in 
sectors where withholding and information reporting are performed, 
compliance increases.135 FATCA essentially uses a blend of withholding threat 
and corroborative information reporting to force taxpayers to comply. 
However, unlike domestic information reporting, FATCA reporting does not 
include just taxable payments, but also other extensive financial information 
such as bank account balances and transactions.136 The implementation of 
FATCA has been subject to a number of delays, time extensions, and 
postponements.137 It remains to be seen how these real-world implementation 
challenges may impact the law’s effectiveness. 
b. Obligations on Taxpayers 
i. New Requirements 
In addition to obligations on FFIs, FATCA also imposes new offshore 
reporting requirements on taxpayers while strengthening pre-existing 
 
 130 Resource Center: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated Oct. 11, 2017, 
3:18 PM). 
 131 Id.; see also FATCA Information for Governments, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/corporations/fatca-governments (last updated Aug. 27, 2017). 
 132 See sources cited supra note 131.  
 133 Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam, supra note 7, at 530. 
 134 See sources cited supra note 27. 
 135 See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 27, at 1735–36; see also generally sources 
cited supra note 27. 
 136 I.R.C. § 1471(c) (2012). 
 137 See generally Byrnes, supra note 55, §§ 1.16–.18 (highlighting certain FATCA milestones, deadlines, 
and problem areas).  
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requirements. Taxpayers who hold interests in foreign financial assets over 
certain thresholds (which start as low as $50,000) must now file Form 8938, 
the Statement of Foreign Financial Assets, with their tax return, disclosing the 
maximum value of such interests during the taxable year.138 Reportable assets 
include interests in bank accounts, brokerage accounts, custodial accounts, 
stocks, insurance contracts with cash value, certain assets held through foreign 
entities, and other financial interests.139 The Form 8938 filing requirement is in 
addition to the preexisting FBAR, which must now be filed electronically and 
is due at the same time as the tax return.140  
FATCA coordinates the Form 8938 filing requirement with existing 
required filings of various other forms.141 As discussed below, the law sets 
high penalties, long statutes of limitations, and other adverse consequences for 
failure to disclose assets on those forms or failure to pay taxes. 
ii. Penalties 
Failure to comply with FATCA may lead to severe civil and criminal 
penalties for individual taxpayers, and may extend the statute of limitations for 
auditing the tax return beyond the usual three years.142 Failure to file 
Form 8938 or failure to disclose required information on that form draws a 
maximum $10,000 penalty.143 A continuing failure that persists beyond ninety 
days after the IRS notifies the taxpayer of such failure draws an additional 
penalty of $10,000 every thirty days, capped at $50,000.144 These penalties 
apply regardless of whether there is any actual unpaid tax owed. They are 
waived when the taxpayer can show that the failure is due to reasonable cause 
and not willful neglect; however, the IRS makes that determination on a case-
 
 138 I.R.C. § 6038D; I.R.S. Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (2016). 
Individuals must report foreign financial assets on Form 8938 (and other forms) if the aggregate value of such 
assets exceeds $50,000 on the last day of the taxable year or $75,000 at any time during the taxable year 
($100,000 and $150,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–2(a)(1) to (2) (as 
amended by T.D. 9752, 81 FR 8838). For U.S. taxpayers living abroad, the thresholds are higher: $200,000 on 
the last day of the taxable year or $300,000 at any time during the taxable year ($400,000 and $600,000 for 
married taxpayers filing jointly). Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–2(a)(3) to (4). 
 139 I.R.C. § 6038D; Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–3 (2014).  
 140 See sources cited supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 141 See sources cited supra note 138; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–3(c) to (d); I.R.S., Instructions for 
Form 8938, at 1 (2017) (coordinating Form 8938 filing requirement with requirements to file other forms).  
 142 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8) (2012). 
 143 Id. § 6038D(d)(1). 
 144 Id. § 6038D(d)(2). 
OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 
686 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:655 
by-case basis based upon the facts and circumstances.145 In addition, more 
severe criminal penalties may apply for fraud and other egregious reporting 
failures.146  
In addition to these information-reporting penalties, FATCA also imposes 
an enhanced 40% accuracy-related penalty for any tax underpayments 
attributable to undisclosed foreign financial assets.147 The 40% penalty is twice 
the usual 20% underpayment penalty that applies to other types of assets and it 
applies regardless of aggravating circumstances.148 “Undisclosed foreign 
financial asset” is defined broadly to include not just bank accounts but also 
controlling interests in foreign entities, certain transfers to foreign persons, and 
certain transactions with respect to foreign partnerships and trusts.149 The 
penalty will not be imposed if the taxpayer can show reasonable cause for her 
position and good faith.150  
FATCA has not only implicated foreign financial accounts, but it also has 
made changes to disclosures of interests in certain foreign entities and foreign 
trusts, some of which create statutes of limitations issues.151 For example, 
FATCA amended I.R.C. § 6677 to provide that a failure to file Form 3520 
(which requires information reporting with respect to interests in and 
distributions from foreign trusts) will carry a penalty of $10,000 or 35% of the 
gross reportable amount, whichever is greater.152 The penalty increases by 
$10,000 for every thirty-day period starting ninety days after the IRS notifies 
the taxpayer of a reporting failure, but these subsequent penalties are capped at 
the gross reportable amount in cases where that amount “can be determined by 
the Secretary.”153 
 
 145 Id. § 6038D(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–8(e)(1); see also Andrew Velarde, News Analysis: Is the IRS 
Turning the Screws on Taxpayers in FBAR Exams?, 88 TAX NOTES INT’L 305 (2017) (noting that IRS is 
classifying almost every taxpayer subject to FBAR audit as willful for purposes of penalty imposition, and 
quoting a practitioner as indicating that “[t]he line between negligence and willfulness to evade taxes seems to 
have been forgotten”). 
 146 I.R.C. § 7201 (tax evasion); id. § 7203 (“Willful failure to file returns, supply information or pay 
tax”); id. § 7206 (“Fraud and false statements”).  
 147 Id. § 6662(j). Tax underpayments include both taxable proceeds from undeclared foreign transactions 
that are deposited in foreign accounts as well as interest earned on those accounts.  
 148 Id. § 6662(b)(7), (j).  
 149 Id. § 6662(j). 
 150 Id. § 6664. 
 151 See infra Section II.A.3.b.iii. 
 152 I.R.C. § 6677(a), as amended by Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 
§ 535(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 71 (2010); id. § 6048. Thus, the provision in effect imposes a minimum penalty of 
$10,000. 
 153 Id. § 6677(a). This caps subsequent penalties at the gross reportable amount only where that amount 
can be determined by the Secretary. 
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The new FATCA penalties are in addition to the existing penalties for 
FBAR violations, which have become more salient since 2008. For individuals 
and financial institutions, there is a $10,000 penalty per non-willful FBAR 
violation.154 The FBAR penalty will not be imposed if the violation was due to 
reasonable cause and the taxpayer files delinquent FBARs properly reporting 
the unreported amount.155 The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) provides that 
the tax examiner has some discretion in imposing the non-willful penalty—for 
example, if there is a non-willful violation that spans several years, the 
examiner may recommend a single $10,000 penalty.156  
For willful FBAR violations, the penalty (which applies to individuals and 
FFIs) is capped at the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the balance in the account 
at time of violation.157 Willfulness means “voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty,” and the IRS bears the burden of showing willfulness.158 
The FBAR statute of limitations for assessment of the penalty is generally six 
years.159  
iii. Statutes of Limitation 
FATCA also expands the statute of limitations for foreign financial asset 
offenses beyond the usual rule for domestic offenses. The usual rule is that the 
IRS has three years from when the tax was filed to assess the tax, increasing to 
six years if the omission is more than 25% of the gross income.160 However, 
FATCA extends the statute of limitations to six years if the taxpayer omits 
more than $5,000 of income attributable to a specified foreign financial asset 
that should have been reported, even if there was no 25% understatement.161  
Moreover, FATCA suspends the statute of limitations for foreign financial 
asset reporting failures and certain additional offshore reporting failures as 
well; the statute does not even begin to run until certain required information 
has been reported on the prescribed form.162 The forms subject to the 
suspended statute of limitations now include Form 8621 (PFICs), Form 5471 
 
 154 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) (2012).  
 155 I.R.S. IRM 4.26.16.6.4 (Nov. 6, 2015).  
 156 I.R.S. IRM 4.26.16.6.4.1 (Nov. 6, 2015). 
 157 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C). 
 158 I.R.S. IRM 4.26.16.6.5.1 (Nov. 6, 2015). 
 159 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).  
 160 I.R.C. § 6501(a), (e) (2012). 
 161 Id. §§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii), 6038D. 
 162 Id. FATCA added information reportable per § 6038D, § 1298(f) and the § 1295(b) election to the 
existing list of reporting failures that trigger the extended statute. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8), as amended by Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 513(b), 124 Stat. 71 (2010). 
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(CFCs), Form 8865 (foreign partnership interests), Form 8858 (foreign 
disregarded entities), Form 5472 (25% foreign-owned U.S. corporations and 
foreign companies that are engaged in a trade or business), Form 926 (transfers 
of property to foreign corporations), Form 8938 (foreign financial asset 
disclosures under FATCA), and Form 3520-A (foreign trusts with U.S. 
owners).163 Failure to report this information extends the statute of limitations 
for all items on the tax return unless the taxpayer can establish reasonable 
cause, in which case the statute is only suspended for the item(s) related to the 
failure to disclose.164  
B. The Mechanisms That Drive Enforcement 
The descriptive typology presented in section A of this Part shows that 
while most tax commentary focuses on FATCA, FATCA is not the only aspect 
of offshore tax enforcement. Rather, offshore tax enforcement consists of an 
integrated family of overlapping strategies designed to punish offenders, bring 
noncompliant taxpayers back into compliance, facilitate foreign asset reporting 
and information procurement, and encourage tax compliance going forward.  
The dominant view is that the key driver of increased offshore compliance 
is the emergence of third-party information reporting and corroboration under 
FATCA.165 Yet, this is an oversimplification. Much of the information reported 
under FATCA consists of gross amounts and balances. This, along with 
reporting errors, may make the data difficult to use.166 Moreover, because of 
implementation delays and time lags, FATCA will not necessarily help detect 
tax evasion from pre-FATCA years, although such evasion could certainly be 
detected through other means.167 Thus, the offshore compliance story goes 
beyond simple information exchange and reporting.  
In fact, information reporting aside, there are two additional interlocking 
mechanisms via which enforcement has been effective: (1) the creation of a 
system of “cascading compliance” whereby the information extracted by one 
initiative is used to push taxpayers and facilitators to cooperate under another 
 
 163 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8) (suspending the statute of limitations for information reportable under 
§§ 1295(b), 1298(f), 6038, 6038A, 6038B, 6038D, 6046, 6046A, and 6048). These forms can be found on the 
IRS website. Forms, Instructions & Publications, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/forms-
instructions (last updated Aug. 27, 2017).  
 164 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8)(A)–(B). 
 165 See sources cited supra note 27 and accompanying discussion.  
 166 Luca Gattoni-Celli, “False Positives” in FATCA Data May Hamper Enforcement, 84 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 387 (2016). 
 167 See supra Section I.B (discussing pre-2008 enforcement initiatives). 
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and (2) the imposition of harsh penalties and open-ended statutes of 
limitations, along with uncertain standards. 
1. Cascading Compliance 
The offshore tax enforcement initiatives have effectively used information 
extracted from one actor to gather data about and threaten to punish other 
actors. This has created a “compliance cascade” effect that encourages more 
and more taxpayers and FFIs to confess and comply. Because the U.S. 
enforcement initiatives involve not just penalties but extraction of information, 
the initiatives do not just recoup revenue, but also may reveal information 
about other actors, thus generating follow-on compliance. 
For example, the United States was able to extract significant information 
about taxpayer accounts, fund flows, and leaver lists through the Swiss Bank 
Program.168 Offending taxpayers, although aware that the United States had 
some information, did not know exactly what information. The IRS and DOJ 
fueled taxpayer worries by actively publicizing DOJ prosecutions of taxpayers 
for offshore tax offenses in interviews, at conferences, and on their websites.169 
It simultaneously announced, promoted, and recommended the OVDPs as an 
option that taxpayers could choose. The possibility that the United States might 
use information garnered from the Swiss Bank Program to trace offending 
taxpayers, combined with the risk of criminal punishment, led many taxpayers 
to enter the OVDPs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted 
that the IRS’s OVDPs deliberately pursue enforcement by using one program 
to generate compliance with respect to another.170  
FATCA, too, employs cascading compliance. Banks and foreign 
governments, anxious to cooperate and to avoid the fate faced by many Swiss 
banks in the Swiss Bank Program, ceded to U.S. pressures to comply with 
FATCA, as evidenced by the network of IGAs now in force and the reporting 
 
 168 See supra Section II.A.2.b (discussing Swiss Bank Program). 
 169 See, e.g., Swiss Bank Program, supra note 109; Offshore Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/tax/offshore-compliance-initiative (last updated Dec. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Offshore 
Compliance Initiative 2016].  
 170 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-318, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: IRS HAS COLLECTED 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BUT MAY BE MISSING CONTINUED EVASION (2013) [hereinafter 2013 GAO REPORT]. 
GAO described the IRS’s OVDP enforcement strategy as follows: (1) identifying a population of evaders (for 
example through data leaks), (2) collecting additional information (e.g., through John Doe summonses) and 
building criminal cases, (3) encouraging participation in OVDPs by publicizing intent to pursue 
noncompliance, (4) actually pursuing noncompliance (e.g., through audit), and (5) using information collected 
from OVDPs to identify additional evasion. Id. at 6. This effectively describes cascading compliance. 
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that is occurring.171 Once one country or institution caved, others did as 
well.172 Similarly, taxpayers with foreign financial assets—even those who 
may not have been willful evaders—have felt pressure from the publicity and 
threats generated by the enforcement initiatives to comply with FATCA 
reporting.173 Even so-called “quiet disclosures”—in which noncompliant 
taxpayers do not enter an OVDP but either amend prior returns and FBARs or 
comply going forward—are arguably an instance of cascading compliance. 
While the IRS disfavors quiet disclosures,174 they may nonetheless show that 
compliance cascades are actually working to encourage compliance where 
none previously existed.  
2. High Penalties and Open Statutes 
Offshore tax enforcement also works by imposing high penalties and 
extended statutes of limitations. The standard deterrence model predicts that 
penalty size and the probability of detection are important variables in 
predicting and incentivizing compliance, and the United States has used both 
these instruments in designing offshore tax enforcement.175 As discussed in 
section A of this Part, FATCA penalties on individuals are extremely high, 
often significantly higher than penalties for similar domestic offenses.176 
Abatement of penalties often hinges on subjective standards like “reasonable 
cause” or “good faith,” which are uncertain. The consequences for FFIs that 
are not FATCA compliant are also high.177 
 
 171 I.R.S. Announcement 2016-27 (2016); Alison Bennett, IRS to Countries: Hurry Up with FATCA 
Reporting Enforcement, INT’L TAX MONITOR (BNA) (2016); J.P. Finet, Ending the Reprieve on FATCA 
Implementation, 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 237 (2016).  
 172 See sources cited supra note 171. 
 173 See, e.g., Marie Sapirie, News Analysis: The Personal Impact of Offshore Enforcement, 71 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 199 (2013) (highlighting stories of taxpayers with offshore assets who may not have been willful 
evaders). 
 174 See Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, supra note 79. 
 175 Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1429, 1431 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (reviewing economic 
literature); James Alm et al., Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data, 
45 NAT’L TAX J. 107 (1992); Janet G. McCubbin, Optimal Tax Enforcement: A Review of the Literature and 
Practical Implications, NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROCEEDINGS 16–17 (2003); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The 
Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency, 89 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 183, 185 (1987); Leandra Lederman, 
Auditing the Crowding Out Hypothesis 2–4, 12 (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 
see also Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUBLIC 
ECON 323, 324 (1972); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968). 
 176 See supra Section II.A.3.b.ii. 
 177 See supra Section II.A.3.a. 
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Moreover, by extending the statutes of limitations for various offshore 
items, the United States has essentially increased the threat of detection. Like 
penalties, the ability to argue that the limitations period has run often hinges on 
uncertain standards such as reasonable cause.178 
The magnitude of penalties imposed, increased duration of detection risk, 
and the uncertainty regarding how subjective standards apply to reduce 
exposure are factors likely to motivate taxpayers to properly disclose their 
foreign income and financial holdings. 
C. Has the U.S. Approach Worked? 
Having described the interlocking components of offshore tax enforcement 
and how they work, we now ask whether the U.S. approach is good tax policy. 
These enforcement initiatives have elicited strong reactions. Proponents hail 
automatic information reporting regimes such as FATCA as a development 
that better allows for taxation of capital and lets countries benefit from FFIs 
serving as information-reporting agents of the government.179 While some 
quibble about design specifics, the general consensus among proponents is that 
the OVDPs, FATCA, and automatic tax information exchange between 
countries are positive developments in advancing the goal of cross-border tax 
compliance, both in the United States and in other countries.180  
IRS and DOJ representatives are, of course, sanguine about the efficacy of 
offshore tax enforcement. For example, recent IRS announcements have 
characterized the OVDPs as having brought in significant revenues and 
taxpayers.181 Similarly, DOJ press releases and comments to tax practitioners 
have emphasized the seriousness of the offshore offenses and the success of 
DOJ criminal prosecutions and have advised taxpayers to enter OVDPs.182  
Yet offshore tax enforcement has also come under serious criticism. Critics 
have disapproved of FATCA on privacy grounds,183 noting that it unduly 
burdens accidental Americans and Americans living abroad, with some 
arguing that overseas Americans ought to be exempted from FATCA 
 
 178 See supra Section II.A.3.b.iii. 
 179 See, e,g., Grinberg, supra note 1, at 347, 349, 353; Grinberg, supra note 7, at 328. 
 180 See generally sources cited supra note 7. 
 181 I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137, supra note 100. 
 182 See Offshore Compliance Initiative 2016, supra note 169.  
 183 Christians & Cockfield, supra note 8, at 19; Cockfield, supra note 8, at 13–14.  
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reporting.184 Critics have also argued that FATCA—and the IGAs that 
effectuate FATCA—may be illegal, unconstitutional, or may violate taxpayer 
rights.185 Still others have pointed out that FATCA is costly and burdensome 
for FFIs and taxpayers.186 Economists, too, have begun to study the possible 
collateral consequences of FATCA, including its impacts on compliance and 
evasion.187 While that work is still unfolding, it will likely be important in 
illuminating both the effective elements as well as the weaknesses of the law. 
In particular, the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), an independent 
organization within the IRS charged with advocating for taxpayer rights, has 
studied various aspects of the offshore tax enforcement initiatives and has 
voiced criticisms. For example, NTA has criticized the OVDPs as being 
regressive, undermining the general tax statutory scheme with respect to 
penalties imposed, and violating taxpayer rights.188 NTA has also criticized 
FBAR and FATCA reporting as duplicative, costly, and burdensome for 
taxpayers, and has recommended elimination of the duplication and creation of 
 
 184 Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, supra note 8; J. Richard (Dick) Harvey Jr., 
Worldwide Taxation of U.S. Citizens Living Abroad – Impact of FATCA and Two Proposals, 4 GEO. MASON J. 
INT’L COM. L. 319, 319–20 (2013); Michael Kirsch, Citizens Abroad and Social Cohesion at Home: 
Refocusing a Cross-Border Tax Policy Debate 36 VA. TAX REV. 205, 244–47, 257–58 (2017) [hereinafter 
Kirsch, Citizens Abroad] (discussing need to address compliance concerns of U.S. citizens abroad); Michael S. 
Kirsch, Revisiting, supra note 8 (proposing to retain citizenship-based taxation but ameliorate the burdens on 
taxpayers living overseas); Mason, supra note 1, at 221. Specific solutions advanced include a same-country 
exception to reporting, or a broader move toward a residence-based, rather than a citizenship-based, system of 
taxation. See also Byrnes, supra note 55, §1.18[7] (explaining the “accidental American” phenomenon). 
 185 Christians, Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs, supra note 8; Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 
8; Allison Christians, What You Give and What You Get: Reciprocity Under a Model 1 Intergovernmental 
Agreement on FATCA, CAYMAN FIN. REV., no. 31, 2013, at 24. 
 186 Behrens, supra note 8, at 221–23; Dizdarevic, supra note 8; Byrnes, supra note 55, §1.19; see also 
Robert W. Wood, FATCA Carries Fat Price Tag, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/robertwood/2011/11/30/fatca-carries-fat-price-tag/#a48572a489ad; cf. FATCA and CRS: How Ready Are 
You?, THOMSON REUTERS, https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/pdf/onesource/fatca-crs-readiness-
survey.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
 187 See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala, Cross-Border Tax Evasion Under a Unilateral FATCA Regime 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 5863, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778453; Joel 
Slemrod, Tax Compliance and Enforcement: New Research and Its Policy Implications (Ross School of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 1302, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726077. 
 188 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS 79–93 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 NTA 
REPORT]; 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95; 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
134–53 (2012).  
OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 
2018] OFFSHORE TAX ENFORCEMENT DRAGNET 693 
a same-country reporting exception for Americans living abroad.189 Further, 
NTA has criticized the FBAR penalties as disproportionate.190 
Academic commentators and policy advocates aside, taxpayers and those 
who represent them have also voiced frustration at FATCA’s burdens. For 
example, the ABA Section on Taxation has submitted comments on how to 
reform the OVDPs to reduce burdens on taxpayers.191 Lobbying groups for 
overseas Americans have also pushed for a “same-country exception” to 
FATCA, whereby Americans living in a foreign country would not have to 
report information with respect to financial accounts in that country.192 A 
group of Americans living in Canada has sued Canada in the Federal Court of 
Canada for violating the Constitution Act of 1867 and the 1982 Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms by releasing financial information and 
breaching financial privacy.193 While the Federal Court of Canada dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ challenge to the U.S.–Canada IGA in 2016 and declined to 
enjoin the transmission of bank account data under the IGA, the suit remains 
ongoing with respect to constitutional issues.194 Some U.S. taxpayers have 
filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of FATCA and the FBAR 
requirements and the legality of various aspects of the OVDPs and the 
streamlined programs.195 While these lawsuits have so far not enjoyed success, 
they are indicative of the controversial nature of the programs in question. 
 
 189 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 353–62 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 NTA 
REPORT]; 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 331–401; 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 238–48. 
 190 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 331–40. See generally Tessa Davis, The Tax-Immigration 
Nexus, 94 DENVER L. REV. 195, 207, 243 (2017) (noting the importance of “proportionality” in considering 
immigration consequences of tax policy). 
 191 Joseph Disciullo, ABA Tax Section Comments on OVDP, Streamlined Programs, 149 TAX NOTES 
515 (Oct. 26, 2015). 
 192 Letter from Charles M. Bruce, Legal Counsel, Am. Citizens Abroad, Inc., to Robert B. Stack, Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y for Int’l Tax Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www. 
americansabroad.org/media/files/files/9d44e9cd/Treasury_Ltr_Same_Country_ACA_160429_FINAL.PDF. 
 193 Jim Atkins, US Expats Launch FATCA Legal Challenge, IEXPATS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www. 
iexpats.com/us-expats-launch-fatca-legal-challenge/; J.P. Finet, Canadian Court Rejects Injunction Request in 
FATCA Case, 149 TAX NOTES 36 (Oct. 5, 2015).  
 194 See Finet, supra note 193; see also ALLIANCE FOR DEFENCE CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY, 
http://www.adcs-adsc.ca/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (describing status of lawsuit).  
 195 See, e.g., Crawford v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 16-3539, 2017 WL 3568494 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017) 
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the case challenging the constitutionality of FATCA and FBAR 
requirements for lack of standing), cert. denied, 2018 WL 1568044 (2018); Maze v. IRS, 862 F.3d 1087 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017), aff’g Maze v. IRS, 206 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016); William Hoke, Court Dismisses Suit 
Challenging IRS Offshore Disclosure Rules, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 396 (2016); William Hoke, Lawsuit 
Challenges IRS Transition Rules for Offshore Disclosures, 149 TAX NOTES 620 (2015).  
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III. THE TROUBLING POLICY UNDERPINNINGS OF THE U.S. APPROACH  
In short, there have been significant criticisms of offshore tax enforcement, 
but these complaints have not, for the most part, struck a chord with 
policymakers or with most tax academics. This Article weighs in on the side of 
critics of offshore tax enforcement, but argues that these critics have not gone 
far enough in articulating the underlying concerns driving their criticisms. The 
U.S. approach is not flawed simply because it is poorly designed. Rather, the 
design flaws are symptomatic of two policy priorities that the United States has 
implicitly embraced in pursuing enforcement: (1) a focus on equalizing 
compliance by taxpayers with domestic assets and those with harder-to-detect 
offshore assets (domestic–offshore parity) by imposing harsher requirements 
and penalties on the latter; and (2) attention to revenue and enforcement.  
These are worthwhile goals. However, in pursuing them, the United States 
has paid insufficient attention to other important policy concerns. For example, 
the United States has failed to make adequate distinctions among taxpayers 
with offshore holdings (intra-offshore distinctions). It has also not paid 
attention to the high externalized costs of enforcement and the potential 
impacts of those costs on various taxpayer populations. The result is a costly 
enforcement approach that risks imposing potentially unfair distributive 
consequences on the wrong populations. Ironically, as others have pointed out, 
the United States ultimately may not even have achieved its original 
enforcement goals. 
A. Domestic–Offshore Parity vs. Intra-Offshore Distinctions 
A key concern of the United States has been to correct enforcement 
inequities between taxpayers with only domestic assets and those hiding assets 
offshore.196 The worry is that offshore assets are easier to hide, so taxpayers 
with offshore assets have an unfair advantage over those operating 
domestically. The 2008 UBS and LGT leaks made these detection and 
enforcement disparities more salient.197  
The United States sought to attain domestic–offshore enforcement parity 
by implementing initiatives that generated compliance cascades and imposed 
high penalties and extended statutes of limitations for covered offshore tax 
offenses. The theory is that because these offshore assets have a lower 
probability of detection, compliance can be equalized by raising penalties and 
 
 196 See Sheppard, supra note 8 (outlining the history of FATCA’s enactment).  
 197 See supra Section I.C. 
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statutory assessment periods, and by increasing income reporting through 
compliance cascades.198 In pursuing this strategy, however, the United States 
paid insufficient attention to another important policy consideration: making 
fair and appropriate intra-offshore distinctions among differently situated 
offshore taxpayers. As a result, the United States may actually have imposed 
disproportionate burdens and sanctions on taxpayers who have offshore assets 
but were not in the original target population.199  
1. Expats, Immigrants, and Accidental Americans 
As discussed in Part I, the population of taxpayers who may have 
committed offshore tax offenses is heterogeneous. It may include willful tax 
cheats but also less willful populations, and it may include both “big time” and 
minor offenders.  
GAO and NTA studies of OVDP participation demonstrate this 
heterogeneity, even among large-dollar offenders: In a 2013 study of OVDP 
participation, GAO found that about half of 2009 OVDP revenues came from 
378 cases in which taxpayers received offshore penalties of $1 million or 
greater (roughly 6% of closed cases).200 It found that many of these taxpayers 
had resided overseas for extended periods (for some, prior to becoming U.S. 
citizens), and of these taxpayers, many had opened their offshore accounts with 
money earned abroad.201 Some OVDP entrants were immigrants who were 
reportedly unaware of their filing obligations.202 Others were immigrants who 
had moved assets to Switzerland to protect them from instability in their home 
countries.203 The GAO estimated that about 47% of the large-penalty taxpayers 
had inherited their offshore accounts (some jointly held) from family members 
who were not U.S. citizens or residents.204 About 40% used complex trusts and 
other arrangements.205 Along similar lines, the NTA has observed that some 
 
 198 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 199 See generally Lewis J. Greenwald & David H. Kaplan, The Exceptional Importance of Getting U.S. 
International Tax Compliance Right, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 683 (2011) (noting exceptionally harsh rules 
concerning international tax compliance); see also sources cited supra note 8; Allison Bennett, U.S. DOJ 
Cracking Down on Offshore Disclosure Tax Cheats, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 15, 2016). 
 200 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 15. Even though the GAO only studied thirty “large-penalty” 
cases out of the 2009 OVDP, it seems likely that these heterogeneous intentions, backgrounds, and actions will 
exist for smaller-balance OVDP participants and for the 2011 and 2012 OVDPs, as well as in the population of 
non-participating offshore taxpayers more generally. Id. 
 201 Id. at 16. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id.  
 204 Id.  
 205 Id. at 17. 
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OVDP participants are relatively “benign” U.S. immigrants or residents with 
family abroad, and has given the example of one U.S. green card holder who 
entered the OVDP and chose not to opt out because she feared a criminal 
conviction that might later bar naturalization.206  
Despite this real-life heterogeneity, the United States has not really 
distinguished among these different populations of offshore offenders in 
designing and pursuing enforcement. This failure stems in part from the fact 
that U.S. worldwide taxation of citizens and residents does not distinguish 
among citizens, green card holders, and substantially present U.S. residents in 
imposing its compliance requirements. 
2. The Case for Intra-Offshore Distinctions 
Is there a principled reason to distinguish between different populations of 
offshore offenders in carrying out offshore tax enforcement? If an individual 
defined to be a U.S. tax resident under the law fails to declare and pay tax on 
$10,000 of offshore income, should her immigration status, place of residence, 
or length of time as a U.S. tax resident really matter in deciding how harshly to 
enforce and punish? This Article argues that there are a number of reasons why 
these distinctions matter.  
a. Sources of Capital and Differential Levels of Culpability 
First, in terms of intent, there is arguably a difference between financial 
capital purposefully moved and hidden offshore and capital that originates 
offshore. Contrast four taxpayers who are out of compliance with their tax 
obligations: 
A. A U.S. taxpayer who fails to pay tax on U.S. income, and then 
removes assets from the United States and hides them in a haven 
country with no taxes (where the asset then generates new untaxed 
income). 
B. A U.S. taxpayer who removes previously taxed assets from the 
United States and hides them in a haven country with no taxes 
(where the asset then generates new untaxed income).  
C. A U.S. taxpayer who works abroad, pays foreign taxes on income 
earned overseas, invests that income overseas, and pays foreign 
 
 206 See 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 228–41; 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 90. 
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taxes on subsequently generated investment income, but who fails 
to declare and pay U.S. taxes on such overseas income. 
D. A U.S. taxpayer who inherits offshore assets upon properly paying 
the foreign country wealth transfer tax, pays foreign taxes on 
income generated by those inherited assets, but fails to declare 
their existence to the United States and pay U.S. tax on income 
they generate.  
There is a strong argument that the behavior in A is worse than in B, C, or 
D, and that the behavior in B is worse than in C or D.207 Scenario A involves 
three bad acts: not paying tax on original capital, purposefully hiding that 
capital offshore, and not paying U.S. or foreign taxes on the income it 
generates. Scenario B involves two bad acts: purposefully hiding post-tax 
capital offshore, and not paying U.S. or foreign taxes on income it generates. 
In contrast, the latter two scenarios involve taxpayers who are fully compliant 
with overseas taxes and who may lack purposeful intent to hide taxes. Such 
taxpayers may have committed the single bad act of failing to pay the relevant 
taxes to the United States. However, the current offshore tax enforcement 
scheme by and large places all four taxpayers in the same category of “offshore 
offenders,” and has not adequately distinguished between them with respect to 
enforcement and penalties.208 Moreover, the high penalties for offshore 
offenses may have been crafted with the egregious behaviors of the taxpayers 
in Scenarios A and B in mind, rather than the less purposeful misconduct of the 
taxpayers in Scenarios C and D. 
b. Less Risk of Double Non-Taxation 
Relatedly, in addition to implicating fewer bad acts, U.S. taxpayers such as 
those in Scenarios C and D may pose less risk of double non-taxation. For 
example, the income generated by foreign assets held by a green card holder 
who is a citizen of another country may already have been subject to taxation 
 
 207 These four scenarios might even be evaluated differently under different international tax policy 
metrics: Proponents of territorial taxation and a capital import neutrality standard might support non-
imposition of tax on foreign income of U.S. taxpayers as a design matter. However, even they would likely say 
that the act of secretly moving assets offshore is a more serious matter. 
 208 For example, while taxpayers of type C and D may elect to remediate their noncompliance under the 
streamlined OVDP, there is no guarantee that the United States will not audit these submissions and find them 
willful and criminally liable. In fact, there is reason to think that some such taxpayers entered into the regular 
OVDP for just this reason. See infra Section III.A.3.a. There is also no guarantee that taxpayers of type C and 
D will be able to plead “reasonable cause” to mitigate harsh penalties and statutes of limitations consequences. 
See supra Section II.A.3.b (discussing penalties and extended statutes of limitations for offshore offenses). 
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in that country.209 Similarly, an American living overseas may be subject to 
residence-based tax jurisdiction in the other country.210 These cases differ from 
the paradigmatic instance of the willful evader who hides assets in a tax haven 
and pays tax nowhere. For cases in which foreign taxes have been paid, the 
U.S. taxpayer may be eligible for a tax credit that offsets foreign taxes paid, 
even if she fully reports her offshore income to the United States. She may also 
be able to reduce her tax liability under a treaty. Thus, high compliance 
burdens placed on these populations may not actually generate much revenue 
for the United States.211  
c. Differential Enforcement Elasticities and Behavioral Responses 
FATCA and the other offshore enforcement initiatives impose significant 
compliance costs on all U.S. taxpayers with offshore holdings, not just evaders. 
But differently situated taxpayers are likely to have varying abilities to avoid 
these compliance costs going forward, which suggests that a tailored approach 
may be required.  
i. Sticky Financial and Work Histories 
While a common response to complaints about compliance costs is to point 
out that taxpayers can avoid those costs by ceasing to hold assets offshore, this 
is not an option for all taxpayers. Expatriates, accidental Americans, and 
inbound immigrants are likely to have offshore work, family, and financial 
lives or histories that require setting up bank accounts or accumulating other 
financial assets in another country. The fix for these populations is not as 
simple as to stop holding assets offshore (or, for that matter, to engage in even 
more undetectable and creative ways to evade taxes). Instead, because their 
financial assets are more closely tied to their histories and movement of their 
actual human capital, it may be harder for them to substitute out of FATCA’s 
reach and costs by either holding purely domestic assets or by finding 
alternative (nonreportable) ways to hold assets. For example, many Americans 
abroad have reported being turned away by banks or other financial institutions 
 
 209 There is no reason to think that green card holders are disproportionately from tax haven countries.  
 210 Others have so noted. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 184, at 338–39; Kirsch, Revisiting, supra note 8, 
at 161–62. Note that whether the income from offshore assets has already been taxed is a different question 
than whether assets moved abroad were themselves post-tax assets. Even willful offshore tax evaders may 
have moved post-tax assets overseas.  
 211 I.R.C. §§ 901 et seq. (2012). If there were a tax treaty between the United States and the foreign 
country, the country of source might cede taxing jurisdiction.  
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as customers as a result of FATCA.212 For these taxpayers, this means real and 
persistent difficulties in gaining access to financial services to accompany their 
everyday work lives.  
Over the long run, these taxpayers may bear disproportionate reporting and 
compliance burdens, precisely because it is likely harder for them to 
“substitute out.” In particular, these populations will likely have to bear the 
nontrivial costs of finding and paying for competent tax preparation assistance 
and advice on an ongoing basis, even if their incomes and taxes owed are not 
particularly high.  
ii. Differential Access to (and Use of) Advice  
It is also possible that expatriates, recent immigrants, and accidental 
Americans on balance have less access to sophisticated legal representation 
and tax advice than high-net-worth individuals seeking to avoid taxes. Inferior 
legal representation means less robust audit defense as well as less information 
about lower-cost or lower-risk substitutes for simple asset stashing. Thus, just 
as they may be less able to opt out of their financial and personal histories, 
some taxpayer populations may also be less able to use alternative planning 
methods to avoid FATCA compliance obligations and may be more likely to 
bear FATCA’s costs over the long run.  
iii. Sticky Holdings Beyond Bank Accounts  
While most commentary about FATCA has largely focused on foreign 
bank accounts, the legislation’s reach goes further. The FATCA reporting and 
compliance provisions require reporting not just of foreign bank accounts, but 
also interests in shares, mutual funds, securities accounts, foreign trusts and 
estates, certain credit card and debit card accounts, life insurance policies with 
cash value, and other items.213 Financial “holdings” such as a credit card with a 
credit balance or other debit card with positive cash value or certain retirement 
accounts may also be reportable.214 Offshore compliance has also expanded to 
include more inclusive reporting of interests in certain foreign entities and 
foreign trusts.215 Some of these additional reporting requirements are 
 
 212 See generally Charles M. Bruce, U.S. Passes on Same-Country Exemption. Too Bad, 154 TAX NOTES 
1431 (2017); see also infra note 273 and accompanying text.  
 213 See supra Section II.A.3.b.i; I.R.C. § 6038D; Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–3 (2014); see also I.R.C. 
§ 1471; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471–5 (as amended by T.D. 9657, 79 FR 12849 2014, and T.D. 9809, 82 FR 2177, 
2017). 
 214 I.R.C. § 6038D; Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–3; see also I.R.C. § 1471; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471–5. 
 215 See sources cited supra note 213.  
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nonobvious and have ensnared unwitting populations, such as holders of 
Canadian mutual funds and retirement accounts.  
The reason for extending FATCA reporting to these assets is clear: For a 
willful evader, they are too easy a substitute for secret offshore accounts, and 
leaving these assets nonreportable would make enforcement ineffective. The 
problem is that some of these assets (such as life insurance policies or 
retirement accounts) are also more likely to be held by taxpayers who actually 
live or have lived abroad. And some of these taxpayers may be less able to 
easily divest of such assets. For these taxpayers, FATCA’s broad enforcement 
reach may simply generate more burdens and traps for the unwary. 
d. Possible Knowledge Disparities 
DOJ and IRS representatives have often argued that at this point, years 
after the original 2008 UBS scandal, any taxpayer who remains noncompliant 
with respect to offshore reporting must necessarily be willful, given 
widespread and growing publicity about offshore tax offenses.216 This, 
however, is not necessarily true. While it is certainly true that a well-advised 
taxpayer who continues to hold undeclared and untaxed assets in a Swiss bank 
account is likely willful, a recent U.S. expat, who prior to moving overseas had 
only domestic assets, may have had no reason to know about offshore 
reporting developments. Similarly, a recent immigrant may not necessarily 
have been apprised of enforcement developments since 2008. Accidental 
Americans who may have been young at the time of the UBS saga may also 
not have full knowledge about the tax rules and reporting requirements. 
Therefore, despite U.S. assertions to the contrary, it is actually quite 
possible that certain groups may be less aware of offshore reporting 
requirements than U.S. authorities seem to think, particularly groups whose 
movements across borders are fluid (for example, those who may be 
newcomers to the United States or may have recently moved abroad). Over the 
long term, it is possible these groups may continue to be ensnared by harsh 
penalties and stringent reporting rules built on the oversimplified assumption 
that all ongoing offenders must be willful. Even if these taxpayers have been 
 
 216 Bennett, supra note 199 (quoting Caroline Ciraolo, former Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for DOJ Tax Division as saying that “the government is becoming more skeptical of people who say 
they weren’t aware of their tax responsibilities”); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Did You Really Mean to 
Hide Those Foreign Accounts? Part 3, 152 TAX NOTES 155 (2016) (quoting IRS special trial attorney and 
division counsel John McDougal as saying, “It’s hard to get less willful over time.”).  
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negligent, negligence is not the same as willfulness and ought to be properly 
distinguished.217 
e. Uneven Collateral Consequences 
Finally, it is important to make intra-offshore distinctions because certain 
taxpayers may suffer disproportionate collateral consequences as a result of 
reporting failures and the offshore tax enforcement initiatives.218  
With respect to immigrants, for example, the NTA and GAO have noted 
that some recent immigrants and green card holders have applied for amnesty 
under the regular OVDPs.219 Some of these taxpayers may have chosen the 
regular OVDP because they wanted assurance that they would not be 
criminally prosecuted as that might bar a future citizenship application.220 
However, entry into even the regular OVDP may present risks for a green card 
holder hoping to naturalize. One of the questions on the naturalization 
application, Form N-400, asks:  
Q. 22: “Have you EVER committed, assisted in committing, or 
attempted to commit, a crime or offense for which you were NOT 
arrested?” 
Another asks: 
Q. 26: “Have you EVER been placed in an alternative sentencing or 
rehabilitative program (for example, diversion, deferred prosecution, 
withheld adjudication, deferred adjudication)?”221 
It is possible, though unclear, that participation in the regular OVDP would 
require a yes response to either or both of these questions, even if the taxpayer 
 
 217 IRM 4.26.16.6.3.1 (Nov. 6, 2015); William Hoke, Practitioners Question Use of OVDP over 
Streamlined Program, 153 TAX NOTES 632 (2016) (quoting an IRS representative as saying, in the context of 
OVDP, that even “gross negligence” is sufficient grounds for entering streamlined rather than regular OVDP); 
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Did You Really Mean to Hide That Foreign Account? Part 4, 85 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 241 (2017) (distinguishing negligence from willfulness). 
 218 Davis, supra note 190, at 200; see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) (holding that U.S. 
green card holders’ conviction under I.R.C. § 7206(1) and (2) for willfully making and subscribing a false tax 
return and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false return were aggravated felonies for which they 
could be deported); cf. Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 788–89 (2014) 
(analyzing circumstances in which collateral nonmonetary sanctions can promote voluntary tax compliance 
and the risks of such sanctions and discussing the risks of deportation of green card holders for tax offenses). 
 219 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 22; 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 228–41; 2014 NTA 
REPORT, supra note 188, at 89–90. 
 220 See 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 90. 
 221 USCIS Form N-400, Application for Naturalization, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
https://www.uscis.gov/n-400 (emphasis omitted).  
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has been spared criminal prosecution. If the taxpayer was truly willful but 
avoided criminal prosecution by entering an OVDP, the first question would 
presumably require a yes response. If the OVDP constitutes a “diversion” 
alternative sentencing program (whereby the offender is diverted out of the 
criminal justice system and into a rehabilitation or amnesty program), then the 
second question would require a yes response as well.222 
The OVDPs were likely not designed to purposely create roadblocks to 
naturalization for green card holders. However, failure to consider this issue 
may create potential difficulties for this population. A well-thought-out 
enforcement approach should address these collateral risks.223 
3. The U.S. Mismanagement of Intra-Offshore Distinctions 
The observations above—which are largely based on common sense—
suggest that there may be good reasons to draw rational intra-offshore 
distinctions among different taxpayer populations. Unfortunately, a survey of 
the offshore enforcement initiatives shows that the United States has made few 
attempts to adequately manage and address these distinctions. It is likely that 
some actors whose misconduct was inadvertent have borne disproportionately 
high costs and consequences as compared with more serious offenders. 
a. Questionable OVDP Outcomes 
One place where the United States has not appropriately sorted among 
taxpayers with offshore issues is the OVDPs, which have been critiqued as 
distributionally unfair.  
i. Regressivity  
Perhaps the most troubling problem with the OVDPs is their regressivity. 
There is significant variation in the size of offshore accounts among OVDP 
entrants: A 2013 GAO study estimated that of 10,439 cases closed under the 
2009 OVDP, the bottom 10% had account balances of less than $79,000, and 
the top 10% had balances over $4 million.224 The median offshore account 
 
 222 See also Davis, supra note 190 (making this point with respect to tax crimes more generally).  
 223 See id. at 243–46 (arguing that tax and immigration law should be more sensitive to the collateral 
risks that tax foot faults may create for green card holders). 
 224 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 12. 
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balance was about $568,735 and the mean balance was $1,923,310.225 Thus, 
accountholders both small and large entered the program.  
These accountholders bore offshore penalties incommensurate with the size 
of their offenses: The NTA has studied the OVDPs, and notes that in the 2009 
OVDP, the median offshore penalty paid by those with the smallest accounts 
(who are more likely to be nonwillful, or at least non-egregious) was almost six 
times the median unreported tax liability, while for those with the largest 
accounts, it was only about three times the unreported tax.226 That is, as 
compared to large account holders, those with smaller accounts paid a 
disproportionately harsh offshore penalty relative to the actual tax owed. 
Moreover, the NTA found that unrepresented OVDP participants paid a 
proportionately larger penalty relative to participants navigating the OVDPs 
with representation, regardless of account size.227  
These problems worsened in the 2011 OVDP: The median offshore penalty 
for taxpayers with the smallest accounts increased to eight times the unreported 
tax and taxpayers without representation continued to pay proportionately 
more than all taxpayers other than the bottom 10%.228 Thus, the NTA finds that 
“the offshore penalty became increasingly more disproportionate for those with 
small accounts who were most likely to have been benign actors.”229 
As the NTA notes, such regressivity in OVDPs “undermine[s] the statutory 
scheme,” which is supposed to apply harsher penalties to willful as opposed to 
nonwillful violations and to punish large-dollar offenses more severely.230 
Moreover, other features of the 2009 OVDP—such as arbitrary and 
unreasonable IRS interpretations, IRS unwillingness to explain its 
interpretations, IRS delays (which may have caused some benign actors to 
accept disproportionately harsh penalties in order to resolve their cases), and 
IRS one-sided and unreviewable interpretations of the program rules—may 
have violated taxpayer rights.231 
 
 225 Id. at 13. 
 226 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 86.  
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 86–87. 
 229 Id. at 86. 
 230 Id. at 79. 
 231 Id. at 79–93 (including “the rights to pay no more than the correct amount of tax, challenge the IRS’s 
position and be heard, appeal an IRS decision in an independent forum, and to a fair and just tax system”); see 
1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2018 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 43–50 [hereinafter 2018 NTA 
REPORT] (arguing that secrecy and lack of transparency in OVDPs violates taxpayers’ right to be informed); 
see also Maze v. IRS, 862 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff’g Maze v. IRS, 206 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016); 
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More recently, commentators have suggested that the OVDPs may have 
drawn taxpayers who need not have entered the programs at all, and who 
should instead have been in the streamlined program because they were not at 
risk for criminal prosecution.232 
ii. Quiet Disclosures and Offenders “At Large”  
Quiet disclosures refer to instances when a noncompliant taxpayer chooses 
to file amended returns and late delinquent or amended FBARs without 
entering a voluntary disclosure program, or by reporting accounts and income 
going forward, without amending prior years’ returns.233 The IRS regards quiet 
disclosures as problematic because they are unfair to those who come into 
compliance by participating in the OVDPs and paying the required penalties.234 
As Professor Leandra Lederman has observed, the threat of higher sanctions 
against those who do not participate needs to be followed through to 
incentivize OVDP participation and create fair outcomes.235  
IRS estimates suggest that there have been several hundred quiet 
disclosures, while GAO estimates suggest that there were more like 10,595.236 
In addition, the number of taxpayers reporting offshore assets by checking the 
relevant box on Schedule B of Form 1040 nearly doubled to 516,000 between 
tax years 2007 and 2010, increasing from 1% of all taxpayers to 2.5% of all 
taxpayers.237 As GAO notes, for the years 2003 to 2010, “Both the increase in 
the number of foreign accounts reported on Form 1040, Schedule B and the 
increase in FBAR filings are significantly larger than the approximately 39,000 
taxpayers [at the time] that came forward in one of IRS’s offshore 
programs.”238 While there may be legitimate reasons for the increases, the data 
does suggest that some taxpayers who have not come in through the OVDPs 
have come in quietly. 
The question of whether quiet disclosures are problematic is complicated. 
Arguably, quiet disclosures may be appropriate for taxpayers with de minimis 
foot faults because they obviate the need to enter onerous, costly, and 
 
Gubser v. IRS, 680 Fed. App’x 333 (5th Cir. 2017); Andrew Velarde, Appeal Filed in OVDP Transition Rules 
Suit, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1131 (2016). 
 232 Hoke, supra note 217. 
 233 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 2. 
 234 Id. at 23. 
 235 Lederman, supra note 7, at 501–02. 
 236 2013 GAO REPORT, supra note 170, at 24–25. 
 237 Id. at 26–27. 
 238 Id. at 26. 
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regressive OVDP procedures. But for willful taxpayers with higher dollar 
offenses, allowing quiet disclosures is unfair to taxpayers who have voluntarily 
disclosed past offenses. To date, U.S. authorities have not talked about quiet 
disclosures in a way that reflects an appreciation of these nuances. 
iii. Streamlined Program Misuse 
Another problem stems from misuse of the streamlined disclosure 
programs, which are designed to impose smaller penalties for truly nonwillful 
taxpayers.239 While about 65,000 taxpayers entered the streamlined programs, 
there have been concerns that some entrants were actually willful, despite 
claiming otherwise.240 The DOJ recently announced that it is examining 
streamlined filings to pursue and prosecute taxpayers who entered the program 
by falsely claiming nonwillfulness to avoid penalties.241 This move, paired 
with uncertainty over what constitutes “willful” conduct, may have a 
potentially chilling effect on taxpayer willingness to use the streamlined 
program.242 Yet, failure to police the streamlined program for accuracy allows 
program abuse and unfair outcomes. Thus, like quiet disclosures, streamlined 
program misuse presents complexities with respect to fairness across 
heterogeneous taxpayers with offshore issues.  
iv. Lack of Follow Up  
A 2016 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) study 
also found that the IRS undertook little follow-up action regarding taxpayers 
who either were denied access to or withdrew from the OVDP.243 TIGTA has 
suggested that the IRS should mine this data to locate and punish noncompliant 
taxpayers.244 Lack of follow up represents another instance of some tax 
offenders “escaping” while others suffered disproportionate consequences.  
 
 239 See supra Section II.A.2.a.ii. 
 240 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 241 Bennett, supra note 199; Sheppard, supra note 216. 
 242 See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 217 (noting some practitioners’ discomfort with having to determine 
willfulness); Sheppard, supra note 216 (discussing risks of using streamlined program for taxpayers whose 
conduct is, in fact, willful).  
 243 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 100, at 7; see also Sheppard, supra note 
216 (noting that the DOJ is investigating taxpayers who were cleared for OVDP but did not follow through). 
 244 See supra note 243. 
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b. FATCA’s Likely Impacts  
OVDPs aside, FATCA’s reporting and disclosure requirements are likely 
to have uneven impacts on different taxpayer populations and may be another 
instance of failure to make appropriate intra-offshore distinctions. 
i. A Wide Reporting Net 
FATCA applies to a broad swath of taxpayers, not just deliberate offshore 
tax cheats. For example:  
• Even taxpayers who have previously been completely compliant in 
reporting taxable income from foreign assets are now subject to the 
additional forms and filing requirements imposed by FATCA.  
• Americans who live and work overseas must report assets under 
FATCA (subject to slightly higher thresholds) even though their U.S. 
tax owed might be reduced or eliminated by the foreign tax credit or 
foreign earned income exclusion. 
• An immigrant who becomes a U.S. resident for tax purposes (either 
through green card or through the permanent residence test) must 
begin reporting all reportable foreign financial assets regardless of 
tax owed. 
• An immigrant living in the United States who transitions from 
nonresident tax status to resident tax status (for example, when 
transitioning from Form 1040NR filing while on a student visa to 
Form 1040 filing on a work visa, or via a “closer connections” 
determination under a tax treaty) must start reporting all reportable 
foreign financial assets. 
• A U.S. taxpayer who inherits foreign assets must undertake a 
combination of Form 3520 and Form 8938 reporting, and may have 
to report foreign financial assets going forward. 
As discussed, inbound immigrants and Americans living abroad are more 
likely to have inelastic offshore engagements or financial histories, and are 
more likely to have retirement accounts, life insurance, and other holdings that 
must be reported.245 Some of these populations will be less able to easily divest 
from these assets to avoid reporting burdens (either by repatriating them to the 
 
 245 See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 49 (2016) [hereinafter 
2016 NTA OBJECTIVES REPORT] (noting that “[f]urther review of updated and expanded data from FY 2010 
through the present continues to demonstrate the weight of FATCA is being felt not by tax evaders, but by 
U.S. taxpayers who likely would be compliant regardless”). 
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United States or hiding them more thoroughly).246 Moreover, some of these 
assets are more likely to have originated offshore and have been subject to 
taxation in the other country. Yet, FATCA imposes reporting obligations in all 
of these cases.  
FATCA’s wide net would not be a significant problem if the costs of 
compliance were not high. However, as section B of this Part shows, FATCA 
compliance costs are in fact significant.247 
ii. Uniformly Harsh Penalties on Heterogeneous Taxpayers 
As noted, failure to comply with FATCA’s reporting obligations triggers 
harsh penalties and lengthened statutes of limitations, often without regard to 
the actual level of culpability.248 Some of these penalties and lengthened 
limitations periods apply without regard for aggravating circumstances.249 
Under the standard deterrence model, it makes sense to impose high penalties 
and long statutes of limitations to compensate for the increased difficulty of 
detecting offshore holdings and to equalize enforcement against offshore 
populations.250  
The problem, however, is that offshore taxpayers are heterogeneous. 
Therefore, a fair system should vary penalties and statutes of limitations to 
account for different levels of intent and wrongdoing. High penalties may 
make sense if all taxpayers are equally willful, but are less appropriate if some 
taxpayers have more benign motives or have made accidental mistakes. Some 
of the international reporting provisions do nominally contain carve-outs for 
reasonable cause that allow mitigation of penalties. However, some of 
FATCA’s harsh penalty and statues of limitations rules are not subject to 
mitigation with respect to the unreported asset.251 Moreover, there is no 
assurance upfront that any taxpayer will be excused for reasonable cause or 
 
 246 Cf. Lisa Simone et al., Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA), Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 17-62 (September 
2017), at 29–32, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037426 (finding some evidence of 
investors moving assets from FATCA-signing havens to nonsigning havens that provide more secrecy and 
some evidence of increased investment out of nonsigning havens). 
 247 See infra Section III.B. 
 248 See supra Sections II.A.3.b.ii–iii. 
 249 See supra Sections II.A.3.b.ii–iii. 
 250 See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing standard deterrence model). 
 251 See supra Section II.A.3.b.iii; see also 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
314–24 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 NTA REPORT] (noting lack of uniformity in reasonable cause exceptions to 
initial and continuation penalties for failure to file international information returns under various Code 
provisions).  
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good faith.252 In particular, if taxpayers lack good legal representation, they 
may not enjoy forbearance even if the law formally allows it. 
c. Insufficient Punishment for Major Offenders 
Finally, it is questionable whether major offenders have been sufficiently 
sanctioned. While the United States has publicized prosecutions of offshore 
offenders, the number of actual prosecutions remains small, particularly in 
relation to numbers of taxpayers entering OVDPs.253 The small number of 
prosecutions, paired with regressive OVDP outcomes, raises questions of 
whether the worst offenders have been held sufficiently accountable given the 
costs imposed on everyone else. Of course, the United States has had to extend 
some leniency to offenders to gather information and generate the “compliance 
cascades” discussed in this Article.254 However, this is problematic if 
compliance has cascaded on less culpable populations.  
Banks that facilitated offshore tax crimes have also borne fairly light 
consequences. As noted, the DOJ entered into DPAs and NPAs with many 
Swiss banks in exchange for information and cooperation.255 Apart from 
Wegelin and Credit Suisse, offending Swiss banks have largely escaped 
prosecution. Moreover, the Swiss Bank Program has not been replicated for 
banks in other countries, some of which undoubtedly also facilitated offshore 
tax evasion. With few exceptions, banks in other countries have not been 
prosecuted or sanctioned.256 
Deferred or nonprosecutions of corporate entities are commonly justified 
based on political or systemic risk concerns.257 However, the use of these 
 
 252 It bears noting that in the context of FBAR examinations and penalties, practitioners have recently 
commented that the IRS is now presuming that any FBAR failures are willful and is subjecting nearly all 
taxpayers to the severe penalties that apply to willful FBAR violations, rather than the smaller penalty for 
nonwillful violations. Velarde, supra note 145. 
 253 Offshore Compliance Initiative 2015, supra note 71.  
 254 See Allyson Versprille, IRS Expands Offshore Tax Avoidance Efforts Past Switzerland, INT’L TAX 
MONITOR (BNA) (2016); see also supra Section II.B.1. 
 255 See supra Section II.A.2. 
 256 Two notable exceptions are Cayman National Securities Ltd. and Cayman National Trust Co. Ltd., 
both of which pled guilty to conspiracy to hide funds in Cayman bank accounts. See Two Cayman Islands 
Financial Institutions Plead Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Conspiring to Hide More Than 
$130 Million in Cayman Bank Accounts, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
two-cayman-island-financial-institutions-plead-guilty-manhattan-federal-court-conspiring-hide.  
 257 The DOJ’s recent attempt to impose a large fine on Deutsche Bank is an example of how markets 
may adversely react to a high penalty on a large financial institution. Evelyn Cheng, How US Regulators May 
Be Creating Panic Around Deutsche Bank, CNBC (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:38 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/ 
30/how-us-regulators-may-be-creating-a-panic-around-deutsche-bank.html; see Spriha Srivastava & Luke 
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DPAs and NPAs has also been critiqued on the ground of undue leniency, 
unfairness, inappropriate insertion of prosecutors as regulators, and other 
grounds.258 Thus, we should at least ask the question of whether banks and 
other serious offenders have been adequately punished, particularly in light of 
the high costs that have been imposed on other actors.  
B. Compliance and Enforcement vs. Taxpayer Costs 
The second potentially problematic policy commitment embraced by the 
United States is a hyperfocus on revenue and compliance that largely ignores 
the high externalized costs that its initiatives have inflicted on various actors. 
These high costs render the U.S. failure to make intra-offshore distinctions 
more troubling: If compliance were merely inconvenient, the fact that it affects 
heterogeneous taxpayer populations would be less of a concern. But offshore 
tax compliance is costly, and the magnitude of these costs paired with their 
potentially unfair incidence is concerning and merits scrutiny and 
consideration. Moreover, these costs likely outstrip the expected returns from 
offshore enforcement.259 
1. The Returns from Offshore Tax Enforcement 
The cost to the United States of individual offshore tax evasion has been 
estimated at between $40 billion and $70 billion per year.260 The important 
question is how much of this cost can be recouped through offshore tax 
enforcement.  
The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that FACTA will collect 
about $8.714 billion in revenues between 2010 and 2020.261 Recently, the IRS 
commissioner also noted that the OVDPs have brought in about $10 billion 
and 100,000 taxpayers into compliance to date.262 The Swiss Bank Program 
 
Graham, Reaction: Deutsche Bank Shares Rise After Reaching Settlement with DOJ, CNBC (Dec. 23, 2016, 
9:08 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/23/deutsche-bank-says-its-reached-a-72-billion-deal-with-the-department-of-
justice.html.  
 258 See sources cited supra notes 37–38.  
 259 Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.19 (“Since the enactment of FATCA the IRS has received approximately 
$10.0 billion nearly entirely from FBAR penalties and not from tax collection.”). 
 260 JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE 
AND EVASION 1 (2015). 
 261 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-5-10, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN SENATE AMENDMENT 3310, THE “HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT” UNDER 
CONSIDERATION BY THE SENATE (2010).  
 262 I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137, supra note 100. 
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has reportedly collected about $6 billion in penalties from Category 1 and 
Category 2 Swiss banks.263 
2. The High Costs of Offshore Tax Enforcement 
As commentators such as the NTA have observed, the projected revenue 
gains from offshore tax enforcement will likely be smaller than its costs, many 
of which have been externalized on other countries, taxpayers, and FFIs.264 
However, estimating the costs of offshore tax enforcement is tricky, 
particularly because Congress enacted FATCA without a cost-benefit analysis. 
Both FATCA implementation costs and the costs of the other initiatives must 
be considered. 
a. High FATCA Implementation Costs 
i. Costs to FFIs 
FFIs have borne significant FATCA compliance costs.265 Many have had 
to build technology platforms and upgrade computer and compliance systems 
to identify U.S. taxpayers.266 Costs to FFIs also include manpower, training, 
legal, and other administrative costs. 
There is reason to believe that FATCA’s compliance costs are likely to 
exceed revenues raised.267 One estimate places FATCA costs at $8 billion a 
year, far in excess of the $800-million-a-year approximate revenue gain.268 
 
 263 See sources cited supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 264 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 241–44 (noting that “[b]y most measures, FATCA-related costs 
equal or exceed projected FATCA revenue”); see also Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.19. 
 265 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 241–42 (noting that “[t]he FATCA reporting regime places 
significant burdens on FFIs and withholding agents”); Amanda Athanasiou, News Analysis: Small Swiss Banks 
Struggling for Survival, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 566 (2015); Teri Sprackland & Stephanie Soong Johnston, 
“FATCA Fatigue” Hampering Common Reporting Standard, 79 TAX NOTES INT’L 1085 (2015) (noting that 
“[t]he Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act has taken so much time and money that many [financial 
institutions’] management lack the enthusiasm to tackle the new [common reporting] standard, judging from 
the survey results”). 
 266 See, e.g., Jaime Arora & Shamik Trivedi, FATCA Reporting Said to Require Compliance Expertise, 
137 TAX NOTES 357 (2012); Denise Hintzke, 1 Year Later: FATCA Reporting Challenges and Opportunities, 
79 TAX NOTES INT’L 65 (2015) (noting difficulties of obtaining client data from different IT systems). 
 267 Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.19 (citing estimates, surveys, and statements by accounting firms, 
government officials, and consulting firms and noting that “FATCA is proving to be enormously expensive for 
financial institutions to implement and administer”; also noting that “[a]s predicted, the cost of compliance for 
foreign institutions dwarfs the tax revenue the United States is collecting”).  
 268 Kyle Pomerleau, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Goes into Force Today, TAX 
FOUND. (July 1, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca-goes-force-
today; see also Wood, supra note 186.  
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One JP Morgan bank executive recently estimated FATCA compliance costs at 
$100 million per bank for major banks.269 The CEO of Bank of Nova Scotia 
also indicated in a 2013 interview that the bank had already spent about 
$100 million on FATCA compliance.270 A 2016 Thomson Reuters FATCA 
survey of senior executives contains more modest cost estimates: 40% of 
survey respondents planned to spend between $100,000 and $1 million on 
FATCA compliance, with only 4% planning to spend between $10 million and 
$20 million.271 Thus, compliance costs may be lower for smaller banks. Once 
initial cost outlays have been made, the ongoing maintenance costs to FFIs 
may decrease going forward. 
In addition to being difficult to estimate, we also do not know the incidence 
of these FFI costs. It seems likely that FFIs will find ways to pass these costs 
on to customers, both U.S. and non-U.S.272 For example, various U.S. 
expatriates have reported instances of foreign banks refusing them as 
customers.273 It is also possible that banks may pass costs on to customers in 
the form of higher fees. 
ii. Costs to Foreign Governments 
Foreign governments have also had to incur compliance costs. In 
particular, in jurisdictions that have adopted Model 1 IGAs, FFIs turn U.S. 
accountholder information over to domestic authorities, which in turn give the 
data to the United States.274 Countries such as New Zealand and Australia have 
estimated FATCA compliance costs to be high.275 Moreover, it is possible that 
 
 269 Wood, supra note 186. 
 270 John Greenwood, Electronic Spying “A Big Issue” for Banks, Scotia CEO Waugh Says, FIN. POST 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/electronic-spying-a-big-issue-for-
banks-scotia-ceo-waugh-says. 
 271 FATCA & CRS Readiness Survey, THOMSON REUTERS (2016), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/wp-
content/pdf/onesource/fatca-crs-readiness-survey.pdf.  
 272 Dharmapala, supra note 187, at 24.  
 273 Jacqueline Bugnion, Concerns About the Taxation of Americans Resident Abroad, 148 TAX NOTES 
861 (2015) (noting how banks and other FFIs refuse to accept American clients for bank accounts, investment 
and mutual fund accounts, joint accounts, and mortgages); Giles Broom & Allyson Versprille, U.S. 
Ambassador Tells Swiss Banks to Open Doors to Americans, INT’L TAX MONITOR (BNA) (Oct. 19, 2016); see 
also 2018 NTA REPORT, supra note 231, at 54 (noting this “banking ‘lock-out’” phenomenon); William Hoke, 
Credit Suisse Reportedly Freezing Accounts over FATCA Concerns, 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 896 (2016). 
 274 FATCA Information for Governments, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/corporations/fatca-governments (last updated Aug. 27, 2017).  
 275 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Implementation of the FATCA Agreement) Bill 
2014 (estimating that Australia’s preferred option for FATCA compliance would entail a startup cost of 
AUD$255 million and an ongoing cost of $227.2 million over ten years, for a total of $382.68 million over ten 
years); INLAND RECOVERY, TREASURY, SINGLE STAGE BUSINESS CASE, FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE 
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foreign governments and countries may incur indirect costs as a result of 
FATCA. As Professor Dhammika Dharmapala has described, under certain 
assumptions, FATCA may cause residents of foreign countries to engage in 
increased cross-border tax evasion (because FATCA increases the costs of 
investing through their home country FFIs while leaving the cost of investing 
through U.S. financial institutions unchanged).276 
As with FFI costs, it is difficult to predict the incidence of these costs. As 
detailed below, it is also difficult to predict what foreign governments will do 
with the FATCA data they obtain. This decision will have consequences as 
well.277 
iii. FATCA Costs to the United States 
The United States has also borne and will continue to bear FATCA 
implementation costs going forward. TIGTA reported in 2013 that the United 
States incurred $16.6 million in developing the Foreign Financial Institution 
Registration System, which is $2.2 million over budget.278 Although many of 
FATCA’s compliance costs are externalized onto others, the United States will 
have to incur continuing costs to process and use FATCA data.279 Much of the 
data collected via FATCA is likely to be quite raw. It may not adequately 
distinguish between solely held and joint accounts, for example, nor does it tell 
the United States the correct amounts of actual income inclusions.280 The 
 
ACT (FATCA) PROJECT (2014), http://www.treasury.govt.nz/downloads/pdfs/b14-info/b14-2828155.pdf 
(estimating whole-of-like cost to Inland Revenue (excluding FFI costs) of FATCA implementation to be 
NZ$6.146 million excluding depreciation and capital charges); Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, The Cost of 
Complying with FATCA—Similar Initiatives to Follow?, LEXOLOGY (June 3, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=a74e2969-7fe3-4931-999b-7caaf60c5588 (HMRC estimates “one off cost under the IGA 
could be around £0.9bn – £1.6bn, with an ongoing cost of £50 million – £90 million a year”); Gareth Vaughan, 
NZ Banks, Fearing NZ $100 mln Bill, Work with Australian, Canadian and British on Changing 
“Unworkable” US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTEREST.CO.NZ (Sept. 6, 2011, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.interest.co.nz/news/55211/nz-banks-fearing-nz100-mln-bill-work-australian-canadian-and-british-
changing-unworkable- (estimating NZ$100 million cost for the banking industry). 
 276 Dharmapala, supra note 187, at 24. 
 277 See infra Section III.B.2.c.ii (discussing taxpayer privacy considerations).  
 278 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2013-20-118, FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX 
COMPLIANCE ACT: IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS FOR 
THE FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REGISTRATION SYSTEM (2013); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2014-20-094, WHILE THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REGISTRATION SYSTEM DEPLOYED 
ON TIME, IMPROVED CONTROLS ARE NEEDED (2014). 
 279 Dolores W. Gregory, Official: Data Exchange Threatens to Swamp Tax Authorities, INT’L TAX 
MONITOR (BNA) (May 10, 2016). 
 280 For example, IGAs in force report the full value of accounts held jointly with a non-U.S. person, as 
well as gross dividend and interest payments into the accounts, regardless of whether the U.S. holder is 
responsible for the tax reporting. See FATCA Resource Center, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury. 
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United States will likely have to incur additional costs to process and use the 
FATCA data.281 If there are inconsistencies between the data obtained from 
FFIs and that reported on taxpayer returns, the United States may have to do 
some form of audit or follow-up inquiry, which would be another cost.  
As discussed below, some of these costs to the United States are a form of 
agency cost, in which the incentives of the principal (the United States) and the 
agent charged with carrying out the principal’s mission (the FFIs) do not 
align.282 Given the steep penalties for noncompliance, FFIs and foreign 
governments may have an incentive to over-include or over-report, which 
could generate additional costs to the United States to sort through the data. 
This is borne out by recent reports, which indicate that there may be 
problematic false positives in the FATCA data.283  
b. Compliance Costs to Individual Taxpayers 
Governments and financial institutions aside, individual taxpayers also 
bear nontrivial compliance costs.  
i. Costs Associated with FATCA Compliance 
Taxpayers with offshore assets are subject to high costs and burdens from 
FATCA compliance. The offshore disclosure rules are complex and the 
consequences of noncompliance serious. There are a multitude of required 
forms and disclosures, some duplicative.284 While there are dollar thresholds 
below which reporting is not required, these thresholds are quite low, even for 
Americans living abroad, but especially for those living in the United States.285  
In fact, the FATCA reporting thresholds are low enough that compliance 
burdens are not imposed only on high-net-worth taxpayers, but also on 
ordinary taxpayers who may simply have some savings in a bank, retirement 
account, or foreign mutual fund.286 The dollar thresholds for FBAR reporting 
are even lower ($10,000).287 Even if a taxpayer ultimately falls below the 
 
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated Dec. 19, 2017); see also 2013 NTA 
REPORT, supra note 95, at 244 (noting technology that the United States will have to develop to effectively use 
FATCA data). 
 281 See 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 244. 
 282 See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing agency costs). 
 283 Gattoni-Celli, supra note 166.  
 284 See supra Section II.A.3.b.i.  
 285 See supra note 138. 
 286 See supra note 138. 
 287 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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reporting threshold, she would need to spend time to figure out the law or pay 
a professional advisor to make this determination. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that charges for professional services for offshore tax compliance are high, 
whether due to risk exposure to preparers, time spent, or a small pool of 
qualified experts (resulting in the ability to capture rents due to preparer 
undersupply).288 For Americans living abroad, in particular, a limited pool of 
experts, treaty issues, and the need to compute the foreign-earned income 
exclusion and foreign tax credit may particularly necessitate costly tax 
preparation assistance, even if little or no tax is ultimately owed.289 In short, 
offshore compliance is burdensome in terms of professional fees as well as 
time spent complying.290 
Furthermore, as discussed, the potential consequences for mistakes and 
reporting failures for offshore assets are potentially far more severe than those 
in the domestic context.291 Many of those penalties and extended statutes of 
limitations apply regardless of exacerbating circumstances. And although 
penalties may be reduced or eliminated for reasonable cause, this outcome is 
not assured.292  
Compliance with the offshores tax rules may also give rise to anxiety and 
psychic costs to taxpayers because the rules are complex and their application 
uncertain. Moreover, the penalty for getting the rules wrong is high. Psychic 
burdens on taxpayers may persist whether or not the law is actually 
enforced.293  
 
 288 See, e.g., Bugnion, supra note 273 (noting high costs of compliance for Americans living abroad).  
 289 I.R.C. §§ 901, 911 (2012); see also Allison Christians, Regulating Return Preparers: A Global 
Problem for the IRS., 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 391 (2014) (discussing some of the challenges in regulating return 
preparers in the cross-border context). 
 290 See, e.g., Bugnion, supra note 273; Disciullo, supra note 191; 2016 NTA OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra 
note 245, at 48–51.  
 291 See supra Sections II.B.2 and III.A.3.b.ii. 
 292 See supra Sections II.B.2 and III.A.3.b.ii; see also 2017 NTA REPORT, supra note 251 (noting lack of 
uniformity in reasonable cause language in the offshore penalties and recommending that “[p]roviding 
uniformity to and simplifying the application of the reasonable cause exception will promote the taxpayers’ 
right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax and [their right] to a fair and just tax system, and improve 
the administration of the penalty regime by the IRS”). 
 293 In fact, theoretical literature on the economics of crime posits that high penalty schemes with low 
detection probability may be welfare maximizing because this approach reduces enforcement costs. See 
Becker, supra note 175; Serge-Christophe Kolm, A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 265, 266 
(1973) (describing this outcome as “hang tax evaders with probability zero”). 
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ii. Costs of OVDP Participation  
Taxpayers who enter an OVDP may also incur significant costs in addition 
to actual offshore penalties because those procedures are difficult to navigate 
without legal representation. As noted by the NTA, taxpayers who entered 
OVDP without representation paid disproportionately severe penalties 
compared to those with representation.294 While we do not know the exact 
costs to taxpayers of OVDP representation, they are likely nontrivial.  
One might argue that taxpayers who evaded taxes should not now 
complain about high compliance costs. However, as discussed, not all OVDP 
participants were willful offenders; some were arguably not willful at all, and 
(as discussed) the OVDPs generated regressive outcomes.295 Given the 
distributional problems with the program, the high costs of OVDP participation 
look more problematic. Moreover, OVDP participation often involves costs of 
legal representation, which are captured by taxpayer representatives rather than 
inuring to the fisc. 
c. Other Costs 
In addition to the quantifiable dollar costs of compliance, there are 
numerous other indirect costs that ought to be considered.  
i. Taxpayer Substitution and Deadweight Losses  
If taxpayers find more effective ways to avoid U.S. taxes in response to 
FATCA, this may prove costly to the United States. For example, sophisticated 
taxpayers may replace simple asset stashing with more complex structuring 
that is harder to detect. Others may relinquish their U.S. citizenship to avoid 
the U.S. tax regime and its accompanying costs (which may include not just 
taxes owed, but also costs of obtaining competent tax advice, possible costs of 
being denied access to financial services, and psychic costs).296 In fact, the data 
show that the number of Americans giving up their citizenship is at an all time 
 
 294 See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 295 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
 296 See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 
6039G, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,188 (Aug. 3, 2017); Yian Q. Mui, Why Americans Are Giving Up Citizenship in 
Record Numbers, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/01/ 
why-americans-are-giving-up-citizenship-in-record-numbers/?utm_term=.f629e0cfd2d1; Jethro Mullen, 
Record Number of Americans Dump U.S. Passports, CNNMONEY (Feb. 8, 2016, 9:27 AM), http://money.cnn. 
com/2016/02/08/news/americans-citizenship-renunciation/.  
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high, and commentators point to FATCA a significant driver.297 On the flip 
side, immigrants thinking about moving to the United States may decide to 
choose other options instead (for example, staying home or moving to a 
country with lower tax compliance costs). These types of taxpayer behavioral 
substitutions will likely reduce U.S. revenue collections going forward and 
may also generate welfare losses for taxpayers and the United States.  
ii. Taxpayer Privacy and Other Collateral Consequences  
Finally, there are other collateral consequences that might result from 
offshore tax enforcement. For example, a recent survey of Americans living 
abroad suggests that some have experienced indirect burdens as a result of 
FATCA, including having a bank account closed, being unable to open a bank 
or financial account, family stress and conflict with non-American spouses, 
and denial of job opportunities.298  
Another important collateral consequence is the impact on taxpayer 
privacy, including privacy of inbound immigrants in their home countries or of 
Americans living abroad. Much of the current move toward transparency and 
disclosure in international tax has assumed that governments not only are able 
to safeguard taxpayer data but are also benign. However, there is no guarantee 
that governments will not use taxpayer data in deliberately or accidentally 
harmful ways.299 For example, we do not know how foreign governments who 
have entered into Model 1 IGAs will use the taxpayer information procured 
from FFIs for their own (tax or nontax) purposes.300 Depending on the political 
 
 297 See supra note 296; see also 2016 Fourth Quarter Published Expatriates – New Annual Record, 
INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 8, 2017), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2017/02/2016-fourth-quarter-
published-expatriates-new-annual-record.html; 2017 Second Quarter Published Expatriates – Second Highest 
Ever, INT’L TAX BLOG (Aug. 2, 2017), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2017/08/2017-second-quarter-
published-expatriates-second-highest-ever.html; 2017 Third Quarter Published Expatriates – A Total of 1,376, 
INT’L TAX BLOG (Nov. 1, 2017), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2017/11/2017-third-quarter-
published-expatriates-a-total-of-1376.html (noting that “[i]n the first three quarters of 2017, there has already 
been more published expatriates than there was for the entire year of 2015 (4,279)”). 
 298 See FATCA: A Banking Burden Abroad, DEMOCRATS ABROAD (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.democratsabroad.org/fatca_burden; see also Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.18[7][b]; supra note 273.  
 299 See generally William Byrnes, How May the United States Leverage Its FATCA IGA Bilateral 
Process to Incentivize Good Tax Administrations Among the World of Black Hat and Grey Hat Governments? 
A Carrot & Stick Policy Proposal, 31 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1033 (2017). Recently, employees of Argentina’s 
tax agency were arrested for selling taxpayer data. See William Hoke, Police Arrest Data Traffickers at 
National Tax Agency, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L 637 (2018). 
 300 Byrnes raises this point in the context of considering U.S. reciprocity with other governments. See 
Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.20[3] (“A legitimate question is whether it is prudent for the U.S. government to 
trust the governments of the 117 countries that scored a 50 or below on Transparency International’s 
corruption index with taxpayer financial information derived from U.S. bank accounts? Reciprocity may 
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realities and norms in various countries (including the United States), the data 
may be put to uses distinct from revenue collection. Some of these uses may be 
harmful to taxpayers. These downsides of transparency and information 
exchange have received insufficient attention from tax scholars, but their risks 
are real and are likely to become clearer over time.301  
3. Cost Considerations and Social Welfare  
In short, more work is needed to quantify the costs of offshore tax 
enforcement to financial institutions, taxpayers, and governments. However, 
the evidence we do have suggests that these costs are nontrivial. These costs 
should be weighed against the gains from offshore tax enforcement, in 
evaluating our system of enforcement. For example, in situations when costs 
are well in excess of benefits generated, it might be advisable to allow some 
level of evasion to exist, given costly enforcement and finite resources.302  
In the context of offshore tax enforcement, the cost to raise a dollar of 
revenue is likely high, once externalized costs on various actors have been 
taken into account. Furthermore, it is possible that the incidence of those costs 
may fall on U.S. firms and taxpayers over the long run. These externalized 
costs should be accounted for in thinking about the enforcement calculus. Once 
the likely costs of offshore tax enforcement are considered, it is far from 
obvious that offshore tax enforcement as currently constituted is a good policy 
choice, even if it may generate revenue and induce compliance.  
Of course, one must be careful not to understate the benefits of offshore tax 
enforcement. For example, offshore tax enforcement may have helped prevent 
reductions in taxpayer morale and increases in noncompliance, which may 
have resulted from the public finding out about widespread offshore evasion 
 
encourage nefarious governments’ behavior by providing U.S. financial information to feed corruption and 
suppression of political rivals.”). However, concerns about political suppression and other misuses are also 
salient with respect to whether to trust such governments with their own taxpayers’ financial information. 
 301 Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: Will Information Exchange Lead to Information Misuse?, 84 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 537 (2016); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 1 (discussing some of these risks).  
 302 A significant body of economic literature suggests that the goal of the tax administrator should be to 
maximize a social welfare function in light of budget constraints, rather than to raise revenue per se. Slemrod 
& Yitzhaki, supra note 175, at 1447 (“In models with heterogeneous citizens, the standard objective function 
is a social welfare function which has as arguments the utility level of each citizen . . . where the shape of the 
social welfare function implicitly determines the social value placed on the distribution of utilities as opposed 
to the sum of utilities.”); McCubbin, supra note 175, at 17. Raising revenue and maximizing social welfare are 
different because a dollar of revenue transferred from the taxpayer to the government imposes an offsetting 
cost to the taxpayer, but revenue can only be taken at a cost to both government and taxpayer (either an 
administrative cost or an efficiency cost).  
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and feeling taken advantage of. The U.S. offshore tax enforcement measures 
also spurred like-kind measures in other countries, such as mini-FATCA laws 
and the Common Reporting Standard. Even after accounting for these benefits, 
however, FATCA’s costs are nonetheless significant and may be problematic 
in their distribution. A welfare-maximizing tax authority should seek to more 
thoroughly understand these costs to better understand their social welfare 
impacts. 
C. Further Observations  
This Article has argued that offshore tax enforcement has several design 
flaws that derive from the troubling underlying policy priorities that the United 
States has implicitly embraced: (1) domestic–offshore parity and (2) an 
attention to revenue and compliance while paying insufficient attention to the 
costs of enforcement and their distribution. As such, offshore tax enforcement 
may impose high costs on the wrong taxpayers.  
This section offers two further observations that may help explain how 
these costs and distributive concerns have been created and why they persist. 
1. A Predictable Hierarchy of Interests 
The notion that offshore tax enforcement may impose high costs on 
unintended populations is not surprising and is in fact predictable. These 
initiatives were created and enacted against a backdrop in which attention was 
on willful evaders. At the same time, the other affected populations—
immigrants, expatriates, and accidental Americans—were not well positioned 
to raise concerns. Immigrants tend to lack a political voice, Americans living 
abroad were not physically present, and accidental Americans by definition did 
not even know they were American. These populations were thus not well 
organized to lobby for their interests or to protest unfair treatment at the outset. 
They are also relatively small groups, which has likely made them easy to 
ignore or discount.  
Wealthy tax evaders, too, were not in a position to protest the harshness of 
the enacted law. Evaders who were caught were unlikely to be in a position to 
chime in, and those not caught were unlikely to want to be visible. The 
complaints of the tax bar have also been easy to ignore.  
Thus, offshore tax enforcement represents a unique context in which 
neither the most nor arguably least culpable were popular, represented, or 
present enough to effectively question the design of the new enforcement 
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initiatives. As such, it should surprise no one that the law as enacted may have 
been less than perfectly attenuated, and may adversely impact multiple 
taxpayer groups. 
More recently, the expatriate lobby has become more organized, lobbying 
Congress for better treatment (for example, for a same-country reporting 
exception, simplified reporting requirements, or FATCA repeal).303 Expatriates 
now enjoy higher reporting thresholds than taxpayers residing in the United 
States, and were given access to the streamlined OVDP in 2012.304 But 
immigrant groups have been less visible and organized in standing up for their 
concerns. Much recent criticism of FATCA and the other offshore enforcement 
initiatives has been leveled on behalf of expatriates and accidental Americans, 
not immigrants.305 However, as this Article has shown, inbound immigrants are 
affected by the law in distinctive and troubling ways due to their personal and 
financial histories and may suffer unique collateral consequences.306  
The hierarchy of interests that has unfolded is not altogether surprising. 
First, the United States focused on enforcement parity and perceived fairness 
toward “ordinary” American taxpayers holding domestic assets. Subsequently, 
as the expatriate lobby became more organized, attention has slowly turned to 
the concerns of expatriates and accidental Americans. But the concerns and 
distinctive situations of immigrants have, on the whole, received the least 
attention, and may thus be the least salient to policymakers. 
Ultimately, then, what we observe is a classic phenomenon: Laws, 
originally written to catch bad actors who have power to avoid or otherwise 
effectively confront the law, end up primarily ensnaring actors who are less 
culpable or sophisticated, less equipped to deal with the law’s complexity, less 
able to effectively lobby, and less able to substitute out of the law’s grasp 
through planning. Offshore tax enforcement’s facial effectiveness under some 
metrics may mask the fact that the compliance cascades, high-penalty regimes, 
 
 303 Disciullo, supra note 191; Andrew Velarde, Will FATCA Same Country Exception Become the Rule?, 
152 TAX NOTES 1073 (2016); see infra note 322. 
 304 See supra notes 91–93, 138. The streamlined program was opened to taxpayers residing in the United 
States in 2014. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 305 See, e.g., Christians, Global Perspective, supra note 8, at 196; Kirsch, Citizens Abroad, supra note 
184, at 244–48; Kirsch, Revisiting, supra note 8, at 210–17; Mason, supra note 1, at 236–37. Some of this 
criticism appears grounded in an interest in justifying continued citizenship-based taxation, given the burdens 
created by the recent enforcement and administrative initiatives for U.S. citizens abroad. See, e.g., Kirsch, 
Revisiting, supra note 8. 
 306 See also Davis, supra note 190, at 197. 
OEI GALLEYPROOFS 4/23/2018 12:07 PM 
720 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:655 
and open-ended statutes could actually be most costly to and effective at 
ensnaring the wrong people.  
2. Agency Costs  
A second underexplored dynamic that may exacerbate the costs of offshore 
tax enforcement is agency costs deriving from principal-agent problems. 
Agency costs arise when one party (the agent) has the power to act on behalf of 
the other (the principal), but where the agent’s interests may not be aligned 
with those of the principal.307 In the presence of asymmetric information, this 
creates moral hazard on the part of the agent and will give rise to agency costs 
if left unchecked.308 Agency costs may reduce social welfare. 
Principal-agent problems occur in the offshore tax enforcement context in a 
few different ways. First, principal-agent problems may arise in FATCA 
reporting by FFIs. Recently, there have been complaints that some of the data 
provided to the United States by FFIs and foreign governments may contain 
false positives, which may make it hard to use.309 This is not surprising 
because given the harsh FATCA withholding penalty, FFIs will have an 
incentive to report overinclusively. Such overdisclosure creates information 
overload and is a form of agency cost to the United States. 
Second, given the law’s complexity, many taxpayers with offshore issues 
must rely on the assistance of tax advisors either to enter an OVDP or to 
comply with FATCA. Here, principal-agent problems may exacerbate the 
already high costs of enforcement and compliance to the United States and 
taxpayers respectively. For example, in some situations it may be in the 
interests of tax advisors to channel taxpayers into the regular OVDP rather 
than to streamlined programs, so as to collect a higher fee or to mitigate 
professional risks, raising questions about whether some taxpayers are 
overpaying penalties.310 Similar dynamics may also shape the advice an 
advisor may dispense with respect to tax reporting. Depending on how the 
incentives align, a tax advisor may recommend an over- or underinclusive 
reporting approach—for example, overreporting when trying to generate more 
fees or to mitigate professional risks, or underreporting when trying to offer 
 
 307 Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining the concept of agency costs). 
 308 Id. 
 309 Gattoni-Celli, supra note 166. 
 310 Hoke, supra note 217. 
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services or tax positions that are comparable to that of a competitor.311 Such 
advice might not completely align with the best interests of the United States. 
For example, if a preparer recommends overdisclosure, this may render 
reported information more costly to use. If the preparer recommends 
underdisclosure, this would undermine enforcement.  
Third, agency costs may arise with respect to information gathered from 
OVDP participants, banks in the Swiss Bank Programs, and taxpayers, 
facilitators, and banks that have been prosecuted. These actors may be a useful 
source of information about other offshore evasion, but they may provide 
information that is overinclusive, inaccurate, or distortionary if this is in their 
best interests (for example, to avoid prosecution or to reduce penalties 
imposed). 
These dynamics in offshore tax enforcement’s design have scarcely been 
probed in the tax literature. More work is needed to understand and quantify 
the impact of principal-agent dynamics in offshore tax compliance and 
enforcement. To the extent that agents are capturing value and imposing costs 
on the United States and its taxpayers, reforms should be enacted to minimize 
these costs. 
This Article does not suggest that the United States has no regard for intra-
offshore distinctions or externalized costs whatsoever. The point, rather, is that 
in the push for enforcement, some of these considerations seem to have taken a 
back seat. Proponents of offshore tax enforcement rightly point out that the 
U.S. interest in increasing collections, remedying domestic–offshore inequities, 
and ramping up offshore enforcement to reduce offshore evasion are important 
concerns.312 But critics are also right to point out that the competing 
considerations of making appropriate taxpayer distinctions and minimizing 
administrative and efficiency costs have been given insufficient weight, with 
 
 311 We may also see high costs and penalties to taxpayers affecting the behaviors of taxpayer 
representatives and causing them to charge high fees or give overly conservative advice. 
 312 See also Annette Alstadsæter et al., Tax Evasion and Inequality 3 (NBER, Working Paper No. 23772, 
2017), https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/AJZ2017.pdf (finding “the probability of hiding assets offshore rises 
sharply and significantly with wealth” and suggesting that once tax evasion is taken into account, measures of 
inequality increase substantially); Niels Johannesen et al., Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. 
Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/acct_05_17_slemrod.pdf (finding that increased enforcement 
increased foreign account reporting to the IRS, increased wealth disclosed, and increased dividends, interest, 
and capital gains disclosed by individuals who began reporting but did not participate in an OVDP). See 
generally sources cited supra note 7. 
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the result that the U.S. approach may impose high costs on the wrong 
taxpayers.313 
The choices that the United States has made with respect to competing 
policy priorities goes some way toward explaining the “left hand not talking to 
right hand” flavor of the debates between critics and defenders of offshore tax 
enforcement. This Article is not the first to be critical of the U.S. approach, but 
it is the first to explicitly identify the fundamental policy priorities that 
underlie the United States’ enforcement choices and to spell out the competing 
policy metrics that are indirectly being advanced by critics. The ongoing fight 
over offshore enforcement is, at its core, about which set of normative priors 
one holds dearer, and how to weigh each against the other. 
IV. A GENTLER WORLD? A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM  
What is to be done? One possibility is for the United States to repeal 
FATCA and start from scratch, although this outcome seems unlikely. Short of 
total repeal, the United States should undertake reforms that address the two 
underlying problems this Article has articulated: poorly managed intra-
offshore distinctions and high costs and burdens.  
A. Potential Repeal of FATCA 
FATCA is a controversial law, with high costs and uncertain overall social 
welfare and distributional effects. Repeal would significantly reduce the 
inequities, burdens, and costs that the law has inflicted on various populations. 
The question is whether the United States would be able to make willful 
offshore tax cheats comply with their tax obligations if FATCA is eliminated 
altogether.  
There is reason to think that some taxpayers might comply even without 
FATCA—the increased electronic availability of bank account information, the 
decline of bank and jurisdictional secrecy that is occurring independent of 
FATCA, and the proliferation of data leaks that have implicated various 
taxpayers with secret offshore holdings may all act as deterrents against 
evasion.314 Further, complete repeal would not necessarily leave the United 
 
 313 See generally sources cited supra note 8. 
 314 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 49 (noting that many taxpayers burdened by FATCA would be 
compliant regardless); 2016 NTA OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra note 245, at 49 (noting that FATCA’s heavy 
consequences are “being felt not by tax evaders but by U.S. taxpayers who likely would be compliant 
regardless” and that “U.S. taxpayers under the FATCA umbrella who must file Form 8938 . . . are generally at 
least as compliant as the overall U.S. taxpayer population”); 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 REPORT TO 
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States toothless. The United States could leave heightened penalties and 
lengthened statutes of limitations in place as a deterrent against offshore 
evasion, but eliminate FATCA’s onerous and duplicative information reporting 
requirements. 
Practically speaking, however, repeal seems unlikely.315 FATCA was not 
repealed as part of the 2017 tax reform, and the law has arguably become 
entrenched through its network of IGAs in force and other factors.316 FATCA-
like ideas have also at this point proliferated worldwide, as other countries 
have their own mini-FATCA laws modeled on the U.S. approach, and as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) proceeds 
to implement its “Common Reporting Standard,” an information standard for 
the automatic exchange of information between countries.317  
B. Taking Intra-Offshore Distinctions Seriously 
Short of complete repeal, there are nonetheless steps the United States 
could take to advance the policy considerations that up to this point have been 
ignored. There are a number of possible reforms that would give intra-offshore 
distinctions more weight, while still encouraging offshore tax compliance. 
1. Commensurate and Graduated FATCA Penalties  
Practitioners and others have argued that FATCA’s offshore penalties are 
too uniformly severe and ought to be better tailored to account for 
heterogeneous taxpayer situations and motivations.318 In particular, the 40% 
penalty, which applies to any understatement attributable to an undisclosed 
 
CONGRESS (2016), 228 (discussing burdens that result from assuming that all international taxpayers “should 
be suspected of fraudulent activity until they can prove otherwise”); Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash 
Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 50 (2009) (finding that most interviewees 
regarded credit card receipts as taxable and reportable revenue, possibly due to electronic nature of the 
payment); Oei & Ring, supra note 1 (discussing the proliferation of data leaks). 
 315 But see Byrnes, supra note 55, § 1.15 (describing political pushback that has occurred against 
FATCA, including attempts at repeal). 
 316 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, Pub. L. No. 115-97 (2017); Robert Goulder, For FATCA Repeal, 
It’s Now or Never, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017, 3:46 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2017/11/29/for-fatca-repeal-its-now-or-never/#d1585933ed15. 
 317 OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN TAX 
MATTERS 9–10 (2014). 
 318 See supra Sections II.A.3, II.B.2, and II.C; see also 2017 NTA REPORT, supra note 251, at 314–24 
(critiquing design of certain continuation penalties); see also, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, You’ve Never Seen Penalties 
Like These, CNNMONEY (June 4, 2015, 10:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/pf/taxes/irs-
penalties/index.html; Kirsh, Revisiting, supra note 8, 216–18 (suggesting penalty relief for certain “unaware 
citizens” rather than repeal of citizenship taxation).  
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foreign financial asset regardless of negligence or substantiality, is twice the 
usual 20% penalty imposed for negligent understatements, “substantial” 
understatements of income tax liability, or other “substantial” misvaluations.319 
The only way to avoid this penalty is to show reasonable cause, an uncertain 
standard.320  
A flat draconian penalty that places the burden of showing reasonable 
cause on the taxpayer is inappropriate for an offender population likely to have 
widely varying levels of willfulness. For example, one might argue that a 
newly arrived immigrant who has erroneously failed to report and pay tax on 
offshore income should be subject to a less severe penalty, even if she is 
unable to meet a reasonable cause showing.321 Penalties might be redesigned to 
account for levels of familiarity with the U.S. tax and disclosure system (for 
example, based on length of time spent in the United States). Alternatively, the 
penalty structure could be revised to apply only to willful failures, and to place 
the burden on the IRS to show willfulness.  
2. Same-Country Exceptions and Thresholds  
Another possible reform that has been proposed by others is a same-
country exemption for Americans living abroad that would allow FFIs to treat 
the accounts of overseas Americans as domestic accounts.322 A same-country 
exemption, which has been supported by the NTA, would reduce reporting 
 
 319 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(7), (j) (2012). 
 320 Id. § 6664; cf. Jarnagin v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 368 (2017) (finding, in the context of FBAR 
penalties, that taxpayers did not have a reasonable cause defense to FBAR penalties even though they had 
“little involvement” in their tax return preparation, and instead relied on a bookkeeper to manage business 
finances and provide information to tax accountants); Andrew Velarde, Reasonable Cause Is Front and Center 
in FBAR Case, 156 TAX NOTES 151 (2017) (quoting an attorney as noting that “[t]he government’s argument 
in [the Jarnagin] case is a great example of its application of heightened scrutiny in evaluating reasonable 
cause defense to FBAR and other international penalties”). 
 321 See also Davis, supra note 190, at 245–46 (suggesting modified FATCA and FBAR reporting for 
green card holders, including a grace period, to reduce likelihood of immigration-relevant tax foot faults); cf. 
Kirsch, Revisiting, supra note 8, at 216–17. 
 322 Bruce, supra note 212 (noting Treasury’s recently published final and temporary regulations, which 
reject a same-country exemption); Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, supra note 8, at 1407–08; 
FATCA / “Lockout” of Americans Abroad by FFIs / Will “Same Country” Exemption Help?, AM. CITIZENS 
ABROAD, (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/9d44e9cd/Treasury_Ltr_Same_ 
Country_ACA_160429_FINAL.PDF; Same-Country Exception for Accounts of US Taxpayers Residing 
Abroad, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/5d6f2a3a/ 
same-country-exception-letter.pdf; “Same Country” Exemption—Treasury Department Should Insert This 
Exemption into Final FATCA Regulations, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www. 
americansabroad.org/media/files/files/20c8d17a/treasury-letter-same-country-aca-2016-08-10.pdf; see 2016 
NTA OBJECTIVES REPORT, supra note 245, at 52 (same-country exemption); 2015 NTA REPORT, supra note 
189, at 353 (same). 
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costs and burdens on FFIs. It might also make it less likely that a bank would 
turn away American customers.323  
Unfortunately, in final and temporary proposed regulations issued in 
January 2017, Treasury rejected commenter requests for a same-country 
exemption, stating in the preamble: 
The U.S. federal income tax system largely relies on voluntary 
compliance, and third party information reporting of the financial 
accounts of U.S. taxpayers is used to encourage voluntary 
compliance. . . . The information reporting required by FATCA is 
intended to address the use of foreign accounts to facilitate tax 
evasion, and also to strengthen the integrity of the voluntary 
compliance system by placing U.S. taxpayers with accounts held 
with FFIs in a comparable position to U.S. taxpayers with accounts 
held with U.S. financial institutions. This is the case even for U.S. 
taxpayers resident abroad . . . . The Treasury Department and the IRS 
have also decided that the risk of U.S. tax avoidance by a U.S. 
taxpayer holding an account with an FFI exists regardless of whether 
the U.S. taxpayer holds an account in his or her foreign country of 
residence or another foreign country.324 
Treasury’s analysis misses the point: There is, of course, a risk of evasion 
regardless of whether the U.S. taxpayer is holding an account in her home 
country or in a separate haven.325 However, Americans living and working 
abroad are simply not the high-risk evader population that FATCA was 
originally intended to ensnare.326 The point, which Treasury’s analysis misses, 
is that Americans abroad (unlike those who simply stash assets in havens) are 
more likely to have lives connected with their financial capital and more likely 
to suffer real-life consequences resulting from “lockout” from financial 
services.327 Moreover, they are more likely to have actual dollar tax liability 
reduced or eliminated by the foreign tax credit or foreign earned income 
exclusion.328 Therefore, although the risk of tax avoidance certainly exists for 
that population, there is reason to think that the risk is likely smaller than for 
willful tax cheats. FATCA imposes high and distinctive harms on Americans 
living abroad, with potentially not much revenue gain—harms that can be 
 
 323 See supra note 322. 
 324 T.D. 9809, I.R.B. 2017-5 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 325 Cf. Bruce, supra note 212 (arguing that requiring taxpayers to make an election to use same-country 
exemption may help prevent evasion). 
 326 Some may owe little or no taxes after the foreign earned income exclusion and foreign tax credit have 
been accounted for. 
 327 Bruce, supra note 212. 
 328 I.R.C. §§ 301, 312 (2012). 
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lessened through granting a same-country exemption. Treasury should 
therefore revisit its decision to reject calls for a same-country exemption. 
Another possible extension is to have a same-country exemption for certain 
green card holders or Americans who are dual citizens of other countries as 
well.329 Like Americans abroad, foreign citizens who have recently arrived in 
the United States for work and are tax residents under the “substantial 
presence” test might also suffer real-life consequences of “lockout” if their FFI 
account in their home country is shut down. The United States could also 
consider whether reporting thresholds might be raised on the side of individual 
reporting for such green card holders or dual citizens Americans with ties 
abroad, in the same way that they have been for Americans abroad.330 
3. Circumscribe Categories of Reportable Assets 
The United States currently requires FATCA reporting not only of offshore 
bank accounts, but also a variety of other financial interests, including 
insurance policies with cash value, credit and debit cards, retirement accounts, 
mutual funds, and corporate or partnership interests.331 The rationale for this is 
that these types of holdings may be easy substitutes for direct ownership of 
offshore bank accounts; therefore, taxpayers’ ability to employ these more 
complex interests to hide assets must be stymied.  
The problem, of course, is this wider net is likely to ensnare immigrants 
and overseas Americans who are more likely to hold interests in these types of 
financial assets in the course of everyday life and who may be stickier in their 
holdings than willful evaders. The fact that these assets may be reportable (and 
how they should be reported) is also somewhat less obvious, which may lead 
to filing errors and other costs.332  
Because these broad reporting rules are likely to impose harsh impacts on 
populations other than willful evaders, the United States should consider which 
 
 329 Cf. Davis, supra note 190, at 245–46 (suggesting a reporting grace period for green card holders). 
 330 See supra note 138. As an example of alternative threshold design possibilities, J. Richard (Dick) 
Harvey, Jr. has suggested adjusting thresholds for the foreign earned income exclusion, for passive income, 
and for tax filing for citizens living overseas. Harvey, supra note 184, at 338–40. See also Mason, supra note 
1, at 236–37 (suggesting simplifying reforms for U.S. citizens abroad). 
 331 See supra note 213. It also strengthened reporting requirements for certain foreign entities. See supra 
notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
 332 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-19, WORKPLACE RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: BETTER 
GUIDANCE AND INFORMATION COULD HELP PLAN PARTICIPANTS AT HOME AND ABROAD MANAGE THEIR 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS 34–46 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 GAO REPORT] (noting challenges and costs individuals 
face in correctly reporting foreign retirement accounts).  
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of these rules are truly necessary, particularly for taxpayers (such as certain 
green card holders and long-term residents) who have actual substantive 
connections overseas, as well as for Americans living abroad. Mechanisms that 
could be used to lighten the compliance impact of these rules include higher 
thresholds, or same-country exceptions for certain types of assets, or lighter 
penalties or shorter statutes of limitations for nonwillful mistakes related to 
those assets.333 For example, FATCA’s lengthened statutes of limitations for 
certain income omissions and offshore holdings may inflict unduly harsh 
consequences on taxpayers who have made genuine mistakes or have 
inadvertent interests in certain types of foreign financial assets.334 Similarly, 
harsh FBAR and FATCA penalties for offshore holdings that are not obviously 
reportable (such as life insurance or annuity contracts with a cash value) may 
be inappropriate and should be lightened. 
4. Remedying OVDP Regressivity 
The United States should also consider how to remedy the regressive 
outcomes that have occurred in the ODVPs. As discussed, there has been a 
good deal of potential unevenness and unfairness in OVDP administration.335 
The United States should consider correcting those inequities by revisiting the 
most egregious cases and reversing the most inequitable outcomes. At the 
same time, to the extent the OVDPs are still active, the United States should 
continue to work to ensure that the largest and most egregious offenders are 
held appropriately accountable.336 
5. A Nuanced Approach Toward Quiet Disclosures and Streamlined 
Program Participation 
Relatedly, the use of quiet disclosures and the streamlined voluntary 
disclosure program raise complex issues of cost and burden distribution.337 
 
 333 Cf. id. at 44 (explaining the IRS discussion about a possible same-country exception but noting that 
the “IRS decided the ability to review a taxpayer’s foreign retirement data each year through filing a Form 
8938 would allow regulators to evaluate whether contributions, earnings, and distributions were being 
identified and reported accurately”); see also Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, supra note 8, at 
1408 (suggesting exemption certain high-tax jurisdictions from FATCA); Harvey, supra note 184, at 338–39 
(proposing de minimis passive income exemption and increase in earned income exclusion). 
 334 See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text; see also Monica Gianni, PFICs Gone Wild!, 29 
AKRON TAX J. 29 (2014). 
 335 See supra Section III.A.3.a.i. 
 336 Sheppard, supra note 217 (quoting practitioner as saying that in 2017 “[n]ow almost no one enters 
OVDP”). 
 337 See supra Sections III.A.3.a.ii–iii. 
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Egregious offenders, who employ these approaches rather than going through 
the regular OVDPs, present clear cases of unfairness. However, in some 
cases—for example, when the offenses are not particularly serious—quiet 
disclosures or going through the streamlined program may well be the socially 
desirable approach.  
Quiet Disclosures. The IRS’s official position on quiet disclosures is that 
they undermine fairness and are to be discouraged.338 But this is not 
universally true for all taxpayer populations. For those just learning about their 
offshore obligations or those with minor offenses, a simple amendment to a tax 
return or late filing of a disclosure form might actually make sense. For 
example, a taxpayer with an offshore bank account of $200,000 earning 0.5% 
interest might have omitted just over $1,000 of interest income, which 
(assuming a 30% tax rate) might generate $300 of tax. For that taxpayer, a 
quiet disclosure may represent a revenue gain going forward, while not 
imposing thousands of dollars of legal representation fees and penalties to 
enter an OVDP. The fact that the OVDPs have had regressive outcomes on 
small and unrepresented account holders supports this observation.339 
Streamlined Disclosure Programs. Likewise, the IRS has threatened to 
investigate taxpayers who entered the streamlined program to pay lower 
penalties, but whose behavior was in fact willful.340 However, there is a 
plausible argument that even if some borderline-willful taxpayers have slipped 
through the cracks and avoided large offshore penalties by going through the 
streamlined program, this is not necessarily undesirable if it persuades some 
“marginal”341 offenders to comply going forward rather than going deeper into 
hiding. In other words, it is potentially beneficial from a welfare perspective to 
allow some degree of less serious evasion to go unpunished. 
The United States should therefore attenuate its treatment of both quiet 
disclosures and streamlined program participants. Allowing some quiet 
disclosures and permitting some borderline-willful taxpayers to remain in the 
streamlined program would help place offshore tax offenders with less serious 
offenses on the same footing as taxpayers with purely domestic issues. The 
latter are allowed to simply amend erroneous tax returns going back three 
years (for example, to include income accidentally omitted), paying regular 
 
 338 Travis A. Greaves & T. Joshua Wu, Quietly Finding a Home in the Voluntary Disclosure World, 148 
TAX NOTES 207 (2015); Sheppard, supra note 216. 
 339 See supra Section III.A.3.a.i. 
 340 See supra Section III.A.3.a.iii. 
 341 By “marginal,” I mean taxpayers whose behaviors are not the worst, but who may well be willful. 
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interest and penalties.342 Taxpayers with offshore holdings whose offenses are 
relatively minor ought to be able to take this approach as well.  
These questions regarding what to do about those who have come in via 
quiet disclosures and the streamlined program will likely remain material in the 
short to medium term, as the United States continues to conduct “streamlined 
program” audits and to investigate offshore tax cheats by analyzing data in its 
possession.343 It is important that the United States attenuate its approach to 
this group of taxpayers to achieve fair and rational enforcement results. 
Each of the suggestions above carries a number of design possibilities, and 
implementing them will necessitate some degree of line drawing and other 
judgment calls. Although specifics will need to be hammered out, reform is 
certainly possible. There is much to be gained from considering these types of 
interventions, so the fact that there are likely to be concrete design challenges 
should not prevent them from being considered. 
C. Reducing Costs and Burdens 
In addition to making appropriate intra-offshore distinctions, the United 
States should more generally also pursue reforms that reduce the costs and 
burdens of offshore compliance. If burdens were lower, this could potentially 
make failures to appropriately sort between different offshore taxpayers less 
consequential. 
1. Eliminate Duplicative Reporting 
As suggested by the NTA and others, the IRS could eliminate duplicative 
reporting.344 Critics have correctly pointed out that the FBAR and FATCA 
reporting forms (Form 8938) contain significant information overlap but the 
law requires two separate filings.345 This is confusing, raises compliance costs, 
and unnecessarily raises taxpayers’ penalty exposure. The IRS has recently 
moved the FBAR filing deadline to conform to the April 15 due date for Forms 
 
 342 For domestic taxpayers, the statute of limitations for noncompliance beyond three years will have run 
except in cases of gross income omissions or tax fraud. I.R.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 343 See, e.g., Robert W. Wood & Scott B. Weese, In Choosing OVDP or Streamlined, Consider IRS 
Streamlined Audits, 156 TAX NOTES 241 (2017). 
 344 2014 NTA REPORT, supra note 188, at 343 (suggesting that the United States eliminate duplicative 
reporting); see also Harvey, supra note 184, at 339–40; Kirsch, Citizens Abroad, supra note 184, at 246–47; 
Kirsch, Revisiting, supra note 8, at 213–14. 
 345 See sources cited supra note 334; see also Comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR Requirements, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/comparison-of-form-8938-and-fbar-requirements 
(last updated Sept. 5, 2017). 
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8938 and tax returns.346 This is a good first step; a better one would be to 
eliminate pointless and duplicative reporting altogether. While some have 
pointed out that the FBAR and FATCA disclosures serve two separate 
purposes—financial regulation and tax compliance—the information could be 
shared between agencies rather than burdening taxpayers with two separate 
filings.  
2. Move from Gross Reporting to Form 1099-Style Reporting 
The United States should also move toward a system of income-stream 
reporting, rather than the current gross-asset reporting system under FATCA. 
Domestic information reporting of interest and dividends reports taxable 
income to the IRS, not gross amounts. When the payor of interest, dividends, 
or other payments issues a Form 1099-INT or Form 1099-DIV, the payee gets 
a copy telling her what to report on the tax return.347 In the offshore context, 
however, account holders are not told the exact amount of income inclusion 
reported to the IRS. Instead, financial institutions report the information 
specified in the relevant IGA, which may include taxpayer identities, gross 
account balances, and total interest payments, irrespective of whether those 
amounts are taxable income to the taxpayer.  
Gross-asset reporting creates compliance costs for taxpayers and 
enforcement costs to the United States, such as the cost of auditing false 
positives due to FFI reporting errors, the cost of flagging suspected taxpayer 
errors that turn out to be correct, and the potential costs of having to verify 
actual income amounts.348 The current approach also gives the United States 
and foreign governments unnecessarily large amounts of financial information 
about affected taxpayers.349 It would be easy for the United States to reduce 
these costs by redesigning FATCA reporting to more closely resemble 
domestic-style information reporting. FATCA already forces FFIs and other 
offshore entities to obtain U.S. tax forms from account holders to determine 
 
 346 New Due Date for FBARs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/ 
news-releases/new-due-date-fbars-0. The FBAR due date used to be June 30. See I.R.S. News Release IR-
2016-90 (last updated Aug. 12, 2017).  
 347 See I.R.S., Instructions for Forms 1099-INT and 1099-OID (2017) (noting obligation to provide 
statement to payment recipient); I.R.S., Instructions for Form 1099-DIV (2017) (same). 
 348 2013 NTA REPORT, supra note 95, at 245–46 (noting that “the IRS should develop a timely and 
effective mechanism for addressing information reporting errors of FFIs” because “[i]ndividuals and entities 
impacted by such inaccuracies run the risk of substantial penalties”). 
 349 See generally 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 332, at 44 (“IRS officials stated that the agency’s goal 
is to build a database with Form 8938 information on individual taxpayers with foreign assets.”); Hoke, supra 
note 299 (discussing the arrest of Argentina tax agency employees for selling taxpayer information). 
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residency.350 There is no reason why FFIs should not simply report interest or 
dividends paid on bank accounts and stock holdings on Forms 1099, rather 
than reporting the account itself and its inflows and outflows. This change to 
traditional 1099 reporting would make compliance and enforcement simpler 
and less intrusive. 
3. Reducing Agency Costs 
More generally, the United States should undertake reforms that minimize 
the principal-agent dynamics and agency costs that this Article has 
described.351  
For example, commentators have observed that foreign banks have an 
incentive to overreport on U.S. accounts due to harsh withholding tax 
consequences.352 They may also have an incentive to turn away customers with 
U.S. ties.353 Tax policymakers should consider how these tensions might be 
better managed. Lighter penalties on FFIs for reporting failures or higher 
reporting thresholds could reduce the incentive to overreport or to reject U.S. 
customers. Another possibility would be to impose a proportionate penalty on 
FFIs that report excessive false positives.  
Principal-agent costs might also be controlled with respect to taxpayer 
representatives and tax preparers. Return preparers and representatives may 
have an incentive to mis-channel taxpayers to the regular OVDP rather than 
the streamlined program (or vice versa), or to over- or underreport foreign 
financial assets on taxpayer tax returns. They may also charge high fees due to 
heightened penalty risk in the cross-border compliance context. These 
behaviors create agency costs for taxpayers in the form of inappropriate risk 
exposure or higher fees and for the United States in the form of higher 
enforcement and administration costs.  
The United States might consider taking steps to better regulate offshore 
tax preparers to ensure consistent representation and ethical standards.354 
Simplifying foreign asset reporting and making penalties more commensurate 
 
 350 See I.R.S. Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification (2014); I.R.S. 
Form W-8BEN, Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding and 
Reporting (Individuals) (2017). 
 351 See supra Section III.C.2. 
 352 Gregory, supra note 279; see also supra note 348 (NTA noting the risk of erroneous reporting).  
 353 See sources cited supra note 273. 
 354 See Christians, supra note 289 (describing some of the challenges associated with preparer 
regulation). 
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would reduce the ability of tax lawyers and advisers to capture rents and 
impose agency costs on taxpayers and the United States. If taxpayers can 
report foreign assets themselves, or if there is a larger pool of representatives 
assisting with foreign asset reporting due to simplification of procedures or 
penalty risk reduction, this will likely result in less rent capture by agents.  
CONCLUSION 
Offshore tax enforcement is a uniquely complicated exercise. The 
challenge facing the United States—as articulated by many proponents of 
offshore enforcement—has been to catch and enforce the law against egregious 
and willful high-net-worth tax evaders and hold them accountable just like 
taxpayers with purely domestic financial affairs. The United States has taken 
an enforcement-oriented approach in tackling this challenge, but in doing so, it 
has ensnared and imposed costs on several other populations as well. While 
such populations may not be entirely blameless, many are likely less willful, 
less well advised, less elastic, and generally more sympathetic than the willful 
evaders who were the original enforcement targets. The imposition of the 
stringent, high-penalty, and wide-ranging enforcement and reporting initiatives 
on these latter populations should be regarded as overkill, particularly if the 
most culpable populations have the highest ability to avoid the offshore 
enforcement regimes. 
This Article has made some reform suggestions that would put more 
weight on intra-offshore distinctions and on minimizing the compliance, 
administrative, efficiency, and agency costs of offshore tax enforcement. 
Given the complex nature of the enforcement challenge, none of these 
solutions is likely to be perfect. The question is whether the United States can 
reach a better equilibrium of policy tradeoffs while still maintaining an 
effective approach. 
The answer to this question will only become more important going 
forward. As more FATCA data is reported to the United States, the United 
States will face the question of how to use the data. There may be some 
temptation to pursue the lowest-hanging fruit—such as the simplest or least 
well-represented cases—to make examples of some taxpayers or to generate 
revenue. But in the interests of making fair and appropriate intra-offshore 
distinctions, the United States should avoid this temptation. The United States 
ought to focus on the most egregious cases, and moderate its approach for less 
willful populations.  
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Whatever the flaws of FATCA, they are likely to be replicated as other 
countries enact their own mini-FATCA laws modeled on the U.S. approach, 
and as countries implement the OECD’s “Common Reporting Standard.”355 It 
is imperative that all countries take a hard look at the costs and inequities these 
types of cross-border reporting laws may impose on immigrant and emigrant 
populations, and consider how they may be attenuated while still catching 
offshore tax cheats.  
 
 355 See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
